Fahreddin Râzî's Understanding of Mental Existence in the Context of Fer'i Rule

Name: Fahreddin Râzî's Understanding of Mental Existence in the Context of Fer'i Rule
Author: Hasan Korkmaz

Title	Fahreddin Râzî's Understanding of Mental Existence in the Context of Fer'i Rule
Author	Hasan Korkmaz
Publication Place	Giresun University - Giresun University
Subject	İdrak Journal of Religious Research, 2022-12, Vol.2 (2), p.284-310
Type	Book
Language	ara,tur
Digital	Yes
Manuscript	No
Library:	Leitir Library
Library Asset ID	EISSN: 2791-6693
Record ID	cdi_doaj_primary_oai_doaj_org_article_77c686668d5642aba8aed35057915227
Library Location	DOAJ Directory of Open Access Journals
Notes	This article examines Fahreddin Râzî's (d. 606/1210) understanding of mental existence in the context of secondary principles. The accessory rule, which is expressed as "The fact that something [e.g. B] occurs for another thing [e.g. A] is an extension of that other thing [A] occurring in itself" was used as an evidence proving mental existence for the first time in Fahreddin Râzî and Mebâhisü'l-Meşrikıyye. The accessory rule, which claims that the subject about which the judgment is made with an existential quality must exist, has been subjected to various criticisms from four aspects: essence, affirmation, impossibility and negation, respectively. While Râzî proves the secondary rule with the answers he gives to the four objections in Mebâhis, he claims that the secondary rule is not correct with the answers he gives in Mülahhas fi'l-mantık ve'l-hikme. This led Râzî to accept mental existence in Mebâhis and to deny mental existence in Mülahhas. This article proposes to read the understanding of secondary rules, which leads to the acceptance of mental existence in Mebâhis and the denial of mental existence in Mülahhas, based on the purposes of writing the works in question. The role of the approach towards the secondary rule in the acceptance and denial of mental existence is discussed comprehensively, including the ontological and epistemological context on which the objections are based. Thus, it is aimed to reveal the extensions of the epistemological and ontological foundations of the secondary rule in Râzî's philosophical system in a holistic way.
Detaylı Başlık	Fer‘î Kaide Bağlamında Fahreddin Râzî’nin Zihnî Varlık Anlayışı

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Fahreddin Râzî's Understanding of Mental Existence in the Context of Fer'i Rule

Author Hasan Korkmaz

Publication Place Giresun University - Giresun University

Subject İdrak Journal of Religious Research, 2022-12, Vol.2 (2), p.284-310

Type Book

Language ara,tur

Digital Yes

Manuscript No

Library Leitir Library

Library Asset ID EISSN: 2791-6693

Record ID cdi_doaj_primary_oai_doaj_org_article_77c686668d5642aba8aed35057915227

Library Location DOAJ Directory of Open Access Journals

Notes This article examines Fahreddin Râzî's (d. 606/1210) understanding of mental existence in the context of secondary principles. The accessory rule, which is expressed as "The fact that something [e.g. B] occurs for another thing [e.g. A] is an extension of that other thing [A] occurring in itself" was used as an evidence proving mental existence for the first time in Fahreddin Râzî and Mebâhisü'l-Meşrikıyye. The accessory rule, which claims that the subject about which the judgment is made with an existential quality must exist, has been subjected to various criticisms from four aspects: essence, affirmation, impossibility and negation, respectively. While Râzî proves the secondary rule with the answers he gives to the four objections in Mebâhis, he claims that the secondary rule is not correct with the answers he gives in Mülahhas fi'l-mantık ve'l-hikme. This led Râzî to accept mental existence in Mebâhis and to deny mental existence in Mülahhas. This article proposes to read the understanding of secondary rules, which leads to the acceptance of mental existence in Mebâhis and the denial of mental existence in Mülahhas, based on the purposes of writing the works in question. The role of the approach towards the secondary rule in the acceptance and denial of mental existence is discussed comprehensively, including the ontological and epistemological context on which the objections are based. Thus, it is aimed to reveal the extensions of the epistemological and ontological foundations of the secondary rule in Râzî's philosophical system in a holistic way.

Detaylı Başlık Fer‘î Kaide Bağlamında Fahreddin Râzî’nin Zihnî Varlık Anlayışı