Transcendental ethics

Name: Transcendental ethics
Author: Oktar, Sibel

Title	Transcendental ethics
Author	Oktar, Sibel
Publication Date:	2011
Publication Place	- Springer
Type	Book
Language	English
Digital	Yes
Manuscript	No
Library:	Özyeğin University
Library Asset ID	978-94-007-0624-8
Record ID	7e40699a-abcd-4353-8ee8-32179d35369b
Library Location	Humanities and Social Sciences
Date	2011
Notes	Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription.
Sample Text	Our ontological, epistemological and metaphysical point of view is a very important determinant of how we conceive ethics and the possibility of ethical discourse. Kant, G.E. Moore and Wittgenstein had a quite eloquent discourse on ethics though they were, prima facie, incompatible. Kant regards ethics as belonging to supersensible reality, Moore, tells us that “goodness” is a non-natural and intuitively known notion. Wittgenstein says he “respected deeply” that that he himself could not talk about. Both Kant and Wittgenstein might at least find a common point on the idea of ethics being transcendental, whereas Moore strongly objects. I will try to show that Moore’s notion of “good” as a non-natural object that does not exist in time is difficult to conceive without assuming a “transcendental object” and the existence of a supersensible reality, as Kant does. I will investigate the role of transcending the limits of language in Wittgenstein’s conception of ethics where it manifests itself in our attitude towards the world. I will argue that Wittgenstein suggests a transcendental ethics with an account of viewing the world sub specie aeterni, without a need for a supersensible reality.
Cilt	108

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Özyeğin University

Transcendental ethics

Author Oktar, Sibel

Publication Date 2011

Publication Place - Springer

Type Book

Language English

Digital Yes

Manuscript No

Library Özyeğin University

Library Asset ID 978-94-007-0624-8

Record ID 7e40699a-abcd-4353-8ee8-32179d35369b

Library Location Humanities and Social Sciences

Date 2011

Notes Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription.

Sample Text Our ontological, epistemological and metaphysical point of view is a very important determinant of how we conceive ethics and the possibility of ethical discourse. Kant, G.E. Moore and Wittgenstein had a quite eloquent discourse on ethics though they were, prima facie, incompatible. Kant regards ethics as belonging to supersensible reality, Moore, tells us that “goodness” is a non-natural and intuitively known notion. Wittgenstein says he “respected deeply” that that he himself could not talk about. Both Kant and Wittgenstein might at least find a common point on the idea of ethics being transcendental, whereas Moore strongly objects. I will try to show that Moore’s notion of “good” as a non-natural object that does not exist in time is difficult to conceive without assuming a “transcendental object” and the existence of a supersensible reality, as Kant does. I will investigate the role of transcending the limits of language in Wittgenstein’s conception of ethics where it manifests itself in our attitude towards the world. I will argue that Wittgenstein suggests a transcendental ethics with an account of viewing the world sub specie aeterni, without a need for a supersensible reality.

Cilt 108