Yazar
Upneja, A., Özdemir, Özgür
Basım Tarihi
2014-04
Basım Yeri
-
Elsevier
Konu
Firm performance, Compensation, CEO, CFO, Agency theory
Tür
Süreli Yayın
Dil
İngilizce
Dijital
Evet
Yazma
Hayır
Kütüphane
Özyeğin Üniversitesi
Demirbaş Numarası
1873-4693
Kayıt Numarası
521f4276-6b31-41da-aaa2-58c03a253f6c
Lokasyon
Hotel Management
Tarih
2014-04
Notlar
Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription.
Örnek Metin
The current study examines the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance in the U.S. lodging industry. It is not clear-cut whether performance leads to compensation or compensation drives firm performance. Our contention is that cash and lagged equity-based compensation drive the firm performance. Our findings suggest that chief executive officer's (CEO) contemporaneous cash-compensation and one-year lagged equity-compensation positively affect the accounting performance measures return on assets and Tobin's Q; but neither compensation components affects the market-performance measure, stock returns, in the lodging industry. Quantitatively similar findings are found for the chief financial officer (CFO). Further robustness test show that further lags of equity compensation of both named executives do not result in increased stock performance in the lodging industry.
DOI
10.1016/j.ijhm.2013.12.007
Cilt
38