المؤلف
Upneja, A., Özdemir, Özgür
تاريخ النشر
2014-04
مكان النشر
-
Elsevier
الموضوع
Firm performance, Compensation, CEO, CFO, Agency theory
النوع
دورية
اللغة
الإنجليزية
رقمي
نعم
مخطوط
لا
المكتبة
جامعة اوزيجين
معرف أصل المكتبة
1873-4693
رقم السجل
521f4276-6b31-41da-aaa2-58c03a253f6c
موقع المكتبة
Hotel Management
التاريخ
2014-04
ملاحظات
Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription.
نص عينة
The current study examines the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance in the U.S. lodging industry. It is not clear-cut whether performance leads to compensation or compensation drives firm performance. Our contention is that cash and lagged equity-based compensation drive the firm performance. Our findings suggest that chief executive officer's (CEO) contemporaneous cash-compensation and one-year lagged equity-compensation positively affect the accounting performance measures return on assets and Tobin's Q; but neither compensation components affects the market-performance measure, stock returns, in the lodging industry. Quantitatively similar findings are found for the chief financial officer (CFO). Further robustness test show that further lags of equity compensation of both named executives do not result in increased stock performance in the lodging industry.
DOI
10.1016/j.ijhm.2013.12.007
Cilt
38
