نویسنده
Upneja, A., Özdemir, Özgür
تاریخ انتشار
2014-04
محل انتشار
-
Elsevier
موضوع
Firm performance, Compensation, CEO, CFO, Agency theory
نوع
دوره ای
زبان
انگلیسی
دیجیتال
بله
نسخه خطی
خیر
کتابخانه
دانشگاه اوزیغین
شناسه دارایی کتابخانه
1873-4693
شماره ثبت
521f4276-6b31-41da-aaa2-58c03a253f6c
محل کتابخانه
Hotel Management
تاریخ
2014-04
یادداشتها
Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription.
متن نمونه
The current study examines the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance in the U.S. lodging industry. It is not clear-cut whether performance leads to compensation or compensation drives firm performance. Our contention is that cash and lagged equity-based compensation drive the firm performance. Our findings suggest that chief executive officer's (CEO) contemporaneous cash-compensation and one-year lagged equity-compensation positively affect the accounting performance measures return on assets and Tobin's Q; but neither compensation components affects the market-performance measure, stock returns, in the lodging industry. Quantitatively similar findings are found for the chief financial officer (CFO). Further robustness test show that further lags of equity compensation of both named executives do not result in increased stock performance in the lodging industry.
DOI
10.1016/j.ijhm.2013.12.007
Cilt
38
