نویسنده
Özdemir, Özgür, Kizildag, M., Upneja, A.
تاریخ انتشار
2013-09
محل انتشار
-
Elsevier
موضوع
CEO, Compensation, Firm risk, Restaurant industry
نوع
دوره ای
زبان
انگلیسی
دیجیتال
بله
نسخه خطی
خیر
کتابخانه
دانشگاه اوزیغین
شناسه دارایی کتابخانه
1873-4693
شماره ثبت
8fa5f37e-2032-4df7-8428-e3648e01abac
محل کتابخانه
Hotel Management
تاریخ
2013-09
متن نمونه
The structure of compensation packages of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) has been a significant research interest for researchers across various disciplines. In this paper, we examine a unique relationship between CEO compensation and risk (systematic risk) in the US restaurant industry. Our research question stems from the assumption that CEOs must be rewarded with a higher incentive-based compensation in high-risk profile restaurant companies in order to motivate them to perform in their full potential for mutual benefits of the CEO and shareowners. Furthermore, we investigate whether firm risk moderates the relationship between firm performance and CEO total compensation controlling for the firm size and CEO ownership. We draw our sample firms from the US restaurant industry. Findings of our study suggest that firm risk induces a higher proportion of incentive-based compensation for restaurant companies’ CEOs, and firm risk does not seem to moderate the relationship between pay and performance in the restaurant industry.
DOI
10.1016/j.ijhm.2012.11.012
Cilt
34
