Author
Özdemir, Özgür, Kizildag, M., Upneja, A.
Publication Date
2013-09
Publication Place
-
Elsevier
Subject
CEO, Compensation, Firm risk, Restaurant industry
Type
Periodical
Language
English
Digital
Yes
Manuscript
No
Library
Özyeğin University
Library Asset ID
1873-4693
Record ID
8fa5f37e-2032-4df7-8428-e3648e01abac
Library Location
Hotel Management
Date
2013-09
Sample Text
The structure of compensation packages of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) has been a significant research interest for researchers across various disciplines. In this paper, we examine a unique relationship between CEO compensation and risk (systematic risk) in the US restaurant industry. Our research question stems from the assumption that CEOs must be rewarded with a higher incentive-based compensation in high-risk profile restaurant companies in order to motivate them to perform in their full potential for mutual benefits of the CEO and shareowners. Furthermore, we investigate whether firm risk moderates the relationship between firm performance and CEO total compensation controlling for the firm size and CEO ownership. We draw our sample firms from the US restaurant industry. Findings of our study suggest that firm risk induces a higher proportion of incentive-based compensation for restaurant companies’ CEOs, and firm risk does not seem to moderate the relationship between pay and performance in the restaurant industry.
DOI
10.1016/j.ijhm.2012.11.012
Cilt
34
