Author
Ünal, Ercenur, Baturlar, Özge
Publication Date
2020
Publication Place
-
Bogazici University Press
Subject
Theory of mind, False belief, Clause complement, Language-cognition interaction, Language-thought relationship, Theory of mind, False belief understanding, Sentential complementation, Language-cognition interface
Type
Periodical
Language
Turkish
Digital
Yes
Manuscript
No
Library
Özyeğin University
Library Asset ID
1300-8552
Record ID
60939d8e-a6da-4b42-9097-7efd36b24ca1
Library Location
Psychology
Date
2020
Sample Text
The ability to understand the mental states of others develops rapidly in preschool ages. In this article, the relationship between language and the representation of concepts in children's minds is discussed. In order to evaluate this relationship, the person's ability to attribute mental states such as belief, desire and intention to his own and others' behaviors (Theory of Mind) was examined. Particular attention has been paid to the question of to what extent language provides the resources necessary to represent mental states. Empirical findings in this field reveal that language serves as a facilitating tool in the representation and processing of mental states, but is not a necessity for the representation of mental states. The ability to understand others' mental states develops steadily during the preschool years. In this article, we consider how encoding mental states in language makes contact with mental state representations in cognition. To do so, we focus on Theory of Mind, the ability to attribute desires, intentions and beliefs to oneself and others. Specifically, we discuss the extent to which language provides the mental resources necessary for representing mental states. Empirical findings in this domain strongly suggest that language is not necessary for developing an understanding of mental states, but may be one of the many factors that facilitate the development of Theory of Mind.
DOI
10.18492/dad.676900
Cilt
31
