Author
Yavuz, Zikri
Publication Place
Motif Publishing -
Motif Publishing
Subject
Religious studies, 2024-12 (67), p.95-126
Type
Book
Language
ara,eng
Digital
Yes
Manuscript
No
Library
Leitir Library
Library Asset ID
ISSN: 1301-966X, DOI: 10.15745/da.1539324
Record ID
cdi_doaj_primary_oai_doaj_org_article_e030676efb4e499e9e1a5a5ebd3f9328
Library Location
DOAJ (Directory of Open Access Journals)
Notes
In a philosophical and metaphysical sense, fatalism is the thesis that whatever happens must happen, and what will happen is inevitable; Every event or situation that occurs must occur, and every event or situation that does not occur must also not occur. Considering its relationship with human freedom, fatalism simply means that we do not have the power to perform an action opposite to the action we have taken. Our fundamental belief that different situations and alternative actions may exist than those we take when making our decisions and choices is mistaken. While the perpetrator has the will to choose option A, he must also have the option not-A. Considering God's absolute knowledge and knowledge about the future, according to some philosophers, human actions in the future are not free. Since everything is predetermined, our future choices have a truth value before we make them, so they are determined and there are no alternative options available to us. There may be several options as a way out of theological fatalism. The first way to avoid the problem is to see theological fatalism as a plausible option. Accordingly, theological fatalism is the thesis that infallible foreknowledge about human action makes action mandatory and therefore eliminates man's free will. If there is a being, namely God, who infallibly knows the entire future, then no human action is free. Another option is theological fatalism. From this perspective, one might argue that one's actions have truth value before they occur, that one has no choice but to do that action, and that even if one is obliged to do the only option available to one, there may still be room for free will within that obligation. Another solution proposal in order to get rid of fatalism and make room for free will in the libertarian sense is that God's absolute knowledge can be waived. In other words, in order to talk about truly free will, it can be argued that future tense propositions cannot have a truth value, and therefore God's knowledge does not include them. This solution, adopted by many philosophers, also has some problems in terms of God's grace and sovereignty. I would argue that between these two opposing views we may have a third option that does not limit both God's knowledge and human free will. In other words, I will claim that God knows the future accurately without violating the principle of bivalence, and that this accurate knowledge does not necessitate an ontology about the future by creating it from the present, thus a solution that allows alternative options is possible.
Detaylı Başlık
Gelecek Olumsallar, Doğruluk ve Teolojik Fatalizm
