Author
Yılan,M. Abdulkadir, Buyankara, Mahmut, Bağcı, Okan
Publication Place
Gaziantep University -
Gaziantep University
Subject
Theology Academy, 2022-12, Vol.2022 (16), p.43-62
Type
kitap
Language
ara,tur
Digital
Yes
Manuscript
No
Library
Leitir Library
Library Asset ID
ISSN: 2149-3979, EISSN: 2651-2718, DOI: 10.52886/ilak.1206515
Record ID
cdi_doaj_primary_oai_doaj_org_article_7e67d9f5781b499ead84e5029bdfff78
Library Location
DOAJ Directory of Open Access Journals
Notes
Atheism means “God exists.” It is an intellectual attitude that believes that the proposition is false. Since the existence of this intellectual attitude is a reaction to theism, its justification will only be possible by proving that theism is wrong. In this regard, many atheist thinkers from past to present have tried to develop various arguments by centering on the evidence for the existence of God and the conceptions of His nature in order to show the wrongness of theism. Among such intellectual initiatives, various arguments have been developed under the title of "The Problem of Divine Privacy". The most popular argument regarding the problem of divine secrecy is the "Divine Privacy Argument", which was systematized by deductive inference by J. L. Schellenberg in 1993. This argument, which is frequently discussed in today's philosophy of religion, briefly claims the following: If the God of theism exists, one of the qualities attributed to him is that he is a loving being. If so, a God who has these qualities must be open to, and even desire, a relationship with the conscious beings He creates. The basis for this relationship to be real is possible if the parties have accurate information about the existence of the other. Therefore, this will only be possible if God allows it. If theism has a loving God, it is unthinkable that He does not know and create the necessary conditions for such a relationship. In this case, the existence of resistant unbelievers about the existence of God is evidence of the absence of the loving God of theism. Although there are a variety of defenses or objections made against the Divine Secrecy Argument, the main problem with such defenses in general is that they seem to directly or implicitly approve the concept of "God" assumed by Schellenberg. As long as it is assumed that the concept of "God", on which the premises of the argument are based, refers to the God of theism, such defenses are partially successful, but they seem difficult to achieve full success. In order to decide on the existence of what a concept refers to, it is important to first determine what the context of the relevant concept is. If there is no agreement between the parties regarding the meaning of the concept, there is no objective meaning in judging the existence of the thing to which the concept refers. If there is an argument for the non-existence of God, then it should be clear what is meant by the concept of "God". If there is agreement on the concept, only then can a judgment be made regarding the truth value of the conclusion put forward by the argument; Otherwise, what is done is "throwing stones into the darkness". In this study, we aim to discuss the meaning of the concept of "God" defined by Schellenberg. While defining God, Schellenberg accepts the quality of love as an essential quality. Essential qualities are things that are included in the nature and truth of the thing defined and are necessary for the understanding of the meaning. In this context, our primary aim will be to show that the "perfect love" model defined by Schellenberg is not a necessary condition for being a perfect being. We will also argue that the "perfect love" model adopted by Schellenberg is a result of the anthropocentric approach. Thus, we will explain that the concept of "God" on which the argument is based does not correspond to the concept of God accepted by classical theism, nor does it have the correct definitional content. Ultimately, if we can express this correctly; We will show that Schellenberg's claim about the Islamic concept of God, which is far from being a perfect being, does not have justified grounds.
Detaylı Başlık
Schellenberg'in ‘mükemmel sevgi’ tanımı Tanrı için uygun bir nitelik midir?
