Author
EARLY, Ayşenur
Publication Place
Ankara University -
Ankara University
Subject
Ankara University Faculty of Theology journal, 2021-11, Vol.62 (2), p.417-443
Type
Book
Language
ara,eng,tur
Digital
Yes
Manuscript
No
Library
Leitir Library
Library Asset ID
ISSN: 1301-0522, DOI: 10.33227/auifd.988788
Record ID
cdi_doaj_primary_oai_doaj_org_article_0a28f471b250404f94d30d90b18f6f97
Library Location
DOAJ Directory of Open Access Journals
Notes
The first issue of Ebū Ḥāmid el-Ġazālī's (d.505/1111) work titled Tehāfutu'l-Felāsife is about the maintenance of the universe. In this regard, philosophy has four evidences that argue that the universe is ḳadīm. In his second objection to the first of these evidences, Al-Ġazālī argues that it is an inconsistency for philosophy, which argues that it is impossible for an existing being to cause a ḥādis̱ being, to accept the existence of ḥādis̱ in this world. In this article I will examine two points that are key to this objection. First, I will discuss al-Ġazālī's criticism that such a series is impossible, against the philosophers' claim that it is possible for the ḥādis̱s occurring in the universe to form an infinite series, in order to show that the existence of ḥādis̱s in an eternal world does not constitute a contradiction. Secondly, philosophy states that the source of the events taking place in the world is not God, the eternal being; I will point out that al-Ġazālī's objection to the claim that the heavens have cyclical movements reveals some of the impasses caused by the theory of ṣudūr. The first discussion of Ebū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī's (d.505/1111), Tahāfut al-Falāsifa, is about the eternity of the world. In the first discussion, he summarizes four proofs of philosophers for the eternity of the world. In his second objection to the first evidence of falāsifa, al-Ghazālī, argues that it is inconsistent for falāsifa accepting that there are temporal beings in this world, given that they defend the impossibility of an eternal being to cause a temporal being. In this article, I will examine two key points of al-Ghazālī's objection. First, I will deal with al-Ghazālī's critique of the philosophers in which he argues that it is impossible for temporal events to form an infinite series. Secondly, I will draw attention to the fact that al-Ghazālī's objection against the philosophers' claim that the source of the temporal events that take place in the world is not God, but the rotational movements of the celestial spheres, reveals some of the deadlocks caused by the theory of ṣudūr.
Detaylı Başlık
Ḳadīmden Ḥādis̱ Çıkar mı? El-Ġazālī’nin Tehāfutu’l-Felāsife’de Âlemin Ḳıdemine Dair Birinci Delile Yönelttiği İkinci İtirazın Analizi
