Author
Özgökman,Fatih, Bağcı,Okan
Publication Place
Gaziantep University -
Gaziantep University
Subject
Consciousness, Experience, Philosophy, Soul
Type
Book
Language
ara,tur
Digital
Yes
Manuscript
No
Library
Leitir Library
Library Asset ID
ISSN: 2149-3979, EISSN: 2651-2718, DOI: 10.52886/ilak.1203280
Record ID
cdi_doaj_primary_oai_doaj_org_article_bba93ec5881a41838f7b766f30b88196
Library Location
DOAJ Directory of Open Access Journals
Notes
A person's self-consciousness regarding his own existence is beyond doubt for himself. So much so that, as expressed by Descartes, I cannot doubt my own existence even when I doubt everything sensible, therefore, if I doubt, "I think, therefore I am." In other words, I am most clearly and distinctly aware of myself when I perceive, think or desire something, and from this it follows that I exist. Because it cannot be accepted that a thinking thing does not exist, and therefore it is sufficient to think in order to exist. This requires that my thinking being is a substance different from the sense objects I suspect, such as the body. Because the fact that I cannot doubt myself while doubting everything sensible shows that I am not one of the things that are doubted. In short, things that are doubtful and things that cannot be doubted cannot be of one and the same nature. This means that the most basic form of my being is a thinking thing, that is, a soul or a mind. However, the existence of such a soul or mind poses a serious problem according to empiricist epistemology. Because the soul or mind is not specifically available to us in external experience. For this reason, some empiricist thinkers, such as Hume, reject the substantial existence of a self that produces self-consciousness and reduce it to the sum of perceptions or sense experiences, like a theater stage in which events take place. Some empiricist thinkers even go further and argue that perceived things do not require the existence of a substance called "I" that perceives them. However, the fact that the self cannot be shown as an object in experiment is not enough to prove its absence. Because if there are perceptions but there is no perceiving subject, questions such as what or who the perceiver is or where the perceptions are located cannot be answered. However, "I" is the idea of an active subject, and all mental operations such as thinking, knowing or wanting require the presence of this active subject who performs them. It cannot be accepted that the processes in question occur on their own without a subject. Therefore, "I" is not just the sum of perceptions, like a theater stage. Accordingly, empiricist epistemology cannot give a complete explanation of the existence of the self. Therefore, according to empiricist epistemology, although it is true that the self is not an object of experiment, it does not seem possible to deny its active role and existence in all mental processes. So much so that, as stated by Kant, it is unthinkable for knowledge to occur without the existence of consciousness. However, according to Kant, although the existence of consciousness is necessary for the emergence of knowledge, consciousness does not have an information value. Because consciousness does not contain intuition. Therefore, I cannot have knowledge of myself like the knowledge of the objects of intuition. It follows from this that I am not a sensory/material being like the intuition objects of the world. However, according to Kant, it cannot be known that I am a soul or a mind, since I have no intuition. In this way, Kant characterizes both materialism and spiritualism as unknowable. However, Kant's double-sided agnostic attitude is not enough to satisfy people about the nature of their own existence. Because man, who knows sensible objects, was left by Kant as unable to know his own nature. In other words, Kant says that we know the sensible objects, which Descartes doubts, but we cannot know the nature of our own existence, which Descartes finds indubitable. However, contrary to Kant, the absence of knowledge about the materiality of the self can be considered as knowledge about its spirituality. Because the absence of intuition about our own existence, that is, our inability to hold ourselves with our hands or see with our eyes, proves that we are not material, and this means that we are a soul or a mind. In fact, the concepts of soul and mind actually refer to a type of non-material entity.
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