نویسنده
Akçura, Munir Tolga, Ozdemir, Z. D.
تاریخ انتشار
2017
محل انتشار
-
Informa
موضوع
Channel management, Expert services, Expertise pricing, Game theory, Online expertise, Pricing
نوع
دوره ای
زبان
انگلیسی
دیجیتال
بله
نسخه خطی
خیر
کتابخانه
دانشگاه اوزیغین
شناسه دارایی کتابخانه
1557-928X
شماره ثبت
c23f366d-7fc5-41e3-af0e-53af97ef71c9
محل کتابخانه
Business Administration
تاریخ
2017
یادداشتها
Farmer School of Business, Miami University
متن نمونه
Using stylized models, we investigate when and how expert service providers should offer their services online, and whether they should charge separate prices for face-to-face and online services or provide the online service as a free supplement. Interestingly, consumer surplus can rise when a monopolist charges different prices for face-to-face and online services, and it may drop when the monopolist starts offering the online service as a free add-on to its face-to-face service. We find that a market-wide adoption of the online channel by competing experts in a duopoly setting intensifies price competition and thereby reduces overall profits. Furthermore, the rate of adoption is highest when the online service is moderately effective, whereas one of the experts refuses to offer the service when it is highly effective. These results provide theoretical support for the viability of online expert services as well as practical guidance on pricing strategies.
DOI
10.1080/07421222.2017.1297637
Cilt
34
