Mean field multilayer stackelberg differential games in multi-agent systems

عنوان Mean field multilayer stackelberg differential games in multi-agent systems
نویسنده Oner, A., Gunel, G. O., Saldı, Naci
تاریخ انتشار: 2018
محل انتشار - Ministry Communications & High Technologies Republic Azerbaijan
موضوع Mean field game theory, Stackelberg equilibrium, Hierarchical control, Large scale systems control, Stochastic control, Differential games, Multilayer network control
نوع دوره ای
زبان انگلیسی
دیجیتال بله
نسخه خطی خیر
کتابخانه: دانشگاه اوزیغین
شناسه دارایی کتابخانه 1683-3511
شماره ثبت 86c8f3ba-697a-4ae7-81c9-5a037ff22ecd
محل کتابخانه Natural and Mathematical Sciences
تاریخ 2018
یادداشت‌ها TÜBİTAK
متن نمونه In this paper, we study linear-quadratic hierarchical mean field Stackelberg differential games with decentralized adapted open-loop information structure. In this game model, there are three levels of decision making, with a leader at the top level, sub-leaders at the intermediate level, and a large population of followers at lowest level. Accordingly, the leader cannot influence the followers' actions directly, but instead sub-leaders link up followers to the global leader as an intermediate layer. The leader plays a Stackelberg game with the sub-leaders, and the sub-leaders play a Stackelberg game of the mean field type with the followers. The followers are (weakly) coupled through a mean field term, which only affects the followers' individual costs. One of the contributions of this work is to consider the infinite population limit of the finite-follower multi-layer game model. We establish the existence of Stackelberg equilibrium in the limiting case, which is expected to be an approximate Stackelberg equilibrium by the law of large numbers when the population of followers is finite, but sufficiently large. We show the effectiveness of the proposed method through a numerical example.
Cilt 17
مشاهده در منبع دانشگاه اوزیغین Özyeğin Üniversitesi
Özyeğin Üniversitesi دانشگاه اوزیغین

Mean field multilayer stackelberg differential games in multi-agent systems

نویسنده Oner, A., Gunel, G. O., Saldı, Naci
تاریخ انتشار 2018
محل انتشار - Ministry Communications & High Technologies Republic Azerbaijan
موضوع Mean field game theory, Stackelberg equilibrium, Hierarchical control, Large scale systems control, Stochastic control, Differential games, Multilayer network control
نوع دوره ای
زبان انگلیسی
دیجیتال بله
نسخه خطی خیر
کتابخانه دانشگاه اوزیغین
شناسه دارایی کتابخانه 1683-3511
شماره ثبت 86c8f3ba-697a-4ae7-81c9-5a037ff22ecd
محل کتابخانه Natural and Mathematical Sciences
تاریخ 2018
یادداشت‌ها TÜBİTAK
متن نمونه In this paper, we study linear-quadratic hierarchical mean field Stackelberg differential games with decentralized adapted open-loop information structure. In this game model, there are three levels of decision making, with a leader at the top level, sub-leaders at the intermediate level, and a large population of followers at lowest level. Accordingly, the leader cannot influence the followers' actions directly, but instead sub-leaders link up followers to the global leader as an intermediate layer. The leader plays a Stackelberg game with the sub-leaders, and the sub-leaders play a Stackelberg game of the mean field type with the followers. The followers are (weakly) coupled through a mean field term, which only affects the followers' individual costs. One of the contributions of this work is to consider the infinite population limit of the finite-follower multi-layer game model. We establish the existence of Stackelberg equilibrium in the limiting case, which is expected to be an approximate Stackelberg equilibrium by the law of large numbers when the population of followers is finite, but sufficiently large. We show the effectiveness of the proposed method through a numerical example.
Cilt 17
Özyeğin Üniversitesi
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