Mean field multilayer stackelberg differential games in multi-agent systems

Title Mean field multilayer stackelberg differential games in multi-agent systems
Author Oner, A., Gunel, G. O., Saldı, Naci
Publication Date: 2018
Publication Place - Ministry Communications & High Technologies Republic Azerbaijan
Subject Mean field game theory, Stackelberg equilibrium, Hierarchical control, Large scale systems control, Stochastic control, Differential games, Multilayer network control
Type Periodical
Language English
Digital Yes
Manuscript No
Library: Özyeğin University
Library Asset ID 1683-3511
Record ID 86c8f3ba-697a-4ae7-81c9-5a037ff22ecd
Library Location Natural and Mathematical Sciences
Date 2018
Notes TÜBİTAK
Sample Text In this paper, we study linear-quadratic hierarchical mean field Stackelberg differential games with decentralized adapted open-loop information structure. In this game model, there are three levels of decision making, with a leader at the top level, sub-leaders at the intermediate level, and a large population of followers at lowest level. Accordingly, the leader cannot influence the followers' actions directly, but instead sub-leaders link up followers to the global leader as an intermediate layer. The leader plays a Stackelberg game with the sub-leaders, and the sub-leaders play a Stackelberg game of the mean field type with the followers. The followers are (weakly) coupled through a mean field term, which only affects the followers' individual costs. One of the contributions of this work is to consider the infinite population limit of the finite-follower multi-layer game model. We establish the existence of Stackelberg equilibrium in the limiting case, which is expected to be an approximate Stackelberg equilibrium by the law of large numbers when the population of followers is finite, but sufficiently large. We show the effectiveness of the proposed method through a numerical example.
Cilt 17
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Özyeğin Üniversitesi Özyeğin University

Mean field multilayer stackelberg differential games in multi-agent systems

Author Oner, A., Gunel, G. O., Saldı, Naci
Publication Date 2018
Publication Place - Ministry Communications & High Technologies Republic Azerbaijan
Subject Mean field game theory, Stackelberg equilibrium, Hierarchical control, Large scale systems control, Stochastic control, Differential games, Multilayer network control
Type Periodical
Language English
Digital Yes
Manuscript No
Library Özyeğin University
Library Asset ID 1683-3511
Record ID 86c8f3ba-697a-4ae7-81c9-5a037ff22ecd
Library Location Natural and Mathematical Sciences
Date 2018
Notes TÜBİTAK
Sample Text In this paper, we study linear-quadratic hierarchical mean field Stackelberg differential games with decentralized adapted open-loop information structure. In this game model, there are three levels of decision making, with a leader at the top level, sub-leaders at the intermediate level, and a large population of followers at lowest level. Accordingly, the leader cannot influence the followers' actions directly, but instead sub-leaders link up followers to the global leader as an intermediate layer. The leader plays a Stackelberg game with the sub-leaders, and the sub-leaders play a Stackelberg game of the mean field type with the followers. The followers are (weakly) coupled through a mean field term, which only affects the followers' individual costs. One of the contributions of this work is to consider the infinite population limit of the finite-follower multi-layer game model. We establish the existence of Stackelberg equilibrium in the limiting case, which is expected to be an approximate Stackelberg equilibrium by the law of large numbers when the population of followers is finite, but sufficiently large. We show the effectiveness of the proposed method through a numerical example.
Cilt 17
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