Author
Norde, H., Özen, Ulaş, Slikker, M.
Publication Date
2016-09-01
Publication Place
-
Elsevier
Subject
Game theory, Incentive management, Information asymmetry, Production systems
Type
Periodical
Language
English
Digital
Yes
Manuscript
No
Library
Özyeğin University
Library Asset ID
0377-2217
Record ID
ad881d6c-7308-4792-a61f-1532b48cf0c3
Library Location
Management Information Systems
Date
2016-09-01
Notes
Industrial Development Agency
Sample Text
We study incentive issues seen in a firm performing global planning and manufacturing, and local demand management. The stochastic demands in local markets are best observed by the regional business units, and the firm relies on the business units' forecasts for planning of global manufacturing operations. We propose a class of performance evaluation schemes that induce the business units to reveal their private demand information truthfully by turning the business units' demand revelation game into a potential game with truth telling being a potential maximizer, an appealing refinement of Nash equilibrium. Moreover, these cooperative performance evaluation schemes satisfy several essential fairness notions. After analyzing the characteristics of several performance evaluation schemes in this class, we extend our analysis to include the impact of effort on demand.
DOI
10.1016/j.ejor.2016.02.029
Cilt
253
