Author
Soytaş, Mehmet Ali, Uşar, Damla Durak, Denizel, M.
Publication Date
2019-12
Publication Place
-
Elsevier
Subject
Game theory, Corporate sustainability, Competition, Spillovers, Stackelberg game
Type
Periodical
Language
English
Digital
Yes
Manuscript
No
Library
Özyeğin University
Library Asset ID
0925-5273
Record ID
343e3331-e5ab-4bec-8ebd-6449207f6d27
Date
2019-12
Sample Text
Recent global developments lead companies to include into their strategic plans not only economic sustainability but environmental and social sustainability as well. Companies have been investing in environmental and social sustainability to meet stakeholder demand and/or regulatory demands. Considering this as a market mechanism, we view the sustainability actions of companies as interrelated strategic decisions and propose a Stackelberg game to model the effects of competition for sustainability and sustainability spillovers over the sustainability outcomes of companies. We provide equilibrium solutions for the one leader, two followers game over different intervals of competition levels and spillover rates. Using a numerical example, we observe how the sustainability investments and net benefits change as competition levels and spillover rates change and identify the competition-spillover regions, where each player invests the most and has the advantage in terms of benefit. We discuss implications for both the companies and the policy makers.
DOI
10.1016/j.ijpe.2019.05.008
Cilt
218
