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Do I see what you see? Institutional quality, action observability, and multimarket contact in the global mobile phone industry

Title	Do I see what you see? Institutional quality, action observability, and multimarket contact in the global mobile phone industry
Author	Giachetti, C., Lampel, J., Önöz, Ergün
Publication Date:	2024-02
Publication Place	- Wiley
Subject	Action observability, Home–host country institutional distance, Institutional quality, Multimarket contact, Signaling theory
Type	Periodical
Language	English
Digital	Yes
Manuscript	No
Library:	Özyeğin University
Library Asset ID	2042-5805
Record ID	195581ae-13e8-40b5-91ce-bc98bdd9020f
Library Location	International Business and Trade
Date	2024-02
Sample Text	Research Summary: Drawing on signaling theory and the international business literature that addresses the role of institutions, we argue that multinational enterprises (MNEs) that use multimarket contact (MMC)—that is, meet the same competitors in multiple countries—to reduce rivalry in a given country, will have their actions and performance influenced by the institutional quality of that country. More specifically, we contend that action observability is the mechanism that explains why institutional quality facilitates an MNE's use of MMC with competitors in a host country. We also contend that an MNE's ability to successfully reduce rivalry with host country competitors via MMC is contingent on the institutional quality distance between the MNE's home and host country. We test our hypotheses with data from the mobile phone industry. Managerial Summary: MNEs often meet the same rivals simultaneously in multiple countries, a phenomenon known as market overlap or MMC. Prior studies have found that MMC deters rivals from attacking each other in the countries they have in common. However, these studies have not taken into account the heterogeneity of the institutional environments of the countries in which multimarket rivals compete. We contend that the quality of countries' institutions and the institutional quality distance between home and host countries affect the extent to which MNEs can observe each other's actions, which in turn helps rival MNEs to avoid mutually damaging moves for their sales performance in the countries they have in common.
DOI	10.1002/gsj.1433
Cilt	14

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Do I see what you see? Institutional quality, action observability, and multimarket contact in the global mobile phone industry

Author Giachetti, C., Lampel, J., Önöz, Ergün

Publication Date 2024-02

Publication Place - Wiley

Subject Action observability, Home–host country institutional distance, Institutional quality, Multimarket contact, Signaling theory

Type Periodical

Language English

Digital Yes

Manuscript No

Library Özyeğin University

Library Asset ID 2042-5805

Record ID 195581ae-13e8-40b5-91ce-bc98bdd9020f

Library Location International Business and Trade

Date 2024-02

Sample Text Research Summary: Drawing on signaling theory and the international business literature that addresses the role of institutions, we argue that multinational enterprises (MNEs) that use multimarket contact (MMC)—that is, meet the same competitors in multiple countries—to reduce rivalry in a given country, will have their actions and performance influenced by the institutional quality of that country. More specifically, we contend that action observability is the mechanism that explains why institutional quality facilitates an MNE's use of MMC with competitors in a host country. We also contend that an MNE's ability to successfully reduce rivalry with host country competitors via MMC is contingent on the institutional quality distance between the MNE's home and host country. We test our hypotheses with data from the mobile phone industry. Managerial Summary: MNEs often meet the same rivals simultaneously in multiple countries, a phenomenon known as market overlap or MMC. Prior studies have found that MMC deters rivals from attacking each other in the countries they have in common. However, these studies have not taken into account the heterogeneity of the institutional environments of the countries in which multimarket rivals compete. We contend that the quality of countries' institutions and the institutional quality distance between home and host countries affect the extent to which MNEs can observe each other's actions, which in turn helps rival MNEs to avoid mutually damaging moves for their sales performance in the countries they have in common.

DOI 10.1002/gsj.1433

Cilt 14