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It takes two to tango: the role of the European Union and domestic governments in the making of Central Bank reform in Hungary

Title	It takes two to tango: the role of the European Union and domestic governments in the making of Central Bank reform in Hungary
Author	Civelekoglu, Ilke
Subject	Autonomy, Central banks, Economic reform, EU accession, Europe, European Union, Governance, Hungary
Type	Periodical
Language	Turkish
Digital	Yes
Manuscript	No
Library:	University of Washington
Library Asset ID	ISSN: 1304-7310, EISSN: 1304-7310
Record ID	cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1418128339
Library Location	Check availability & request options
Date	Uluslararasi Iliskiler / International Relations, 1901-01, Vol.9 (36), p.129-148
Notes	ABSTRACT IN ENGLISH: This article addresses how the Hungarian Central Bank gained autonomy in its operations from ruling politicians. While stressing the substantial influence of external actors in exercise of this reform, the article also demonstrates the limits of external influence by shedding light on the domestic political costs of this reform. The high costs of central bank reform in the calculations of the ruling politicians allowed the Central Bank of Hungary to gain partial operational autonomy in 1991, which fell short of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria for EU accession. The article discusses how partial reform furthered in Hungarian context by unpacking the interplay between domestic and external actors. // ABSTRACT IN TURKISH: Bu makale, Macaristan Merkez Bankasi'nin siyasi etkilerden kurtulus ve operasyonel bagimsizligini elde edis sürecini irdelemektedir. Makalede, reformun gerçeklesmesinde dis aktörlerin yadsinamaz etkisine vurgu yapilmakla beraber, bu etkinin sinirlari, özellikle iç siyasette bu reforma nasil bakildiginin alti çizilerek tartisilmaktadir. Macaristan Merkez Bankasi reformu, iktidardaki siyasetçiler açisindan siyasi bedelinin yüksek olmasi sebebi ile 1991 yilinda kismen gerçeklemis ve böylelikle Macaristan Merkez Bankasi, Avrupa Birligine (AB) üyelik için gerekli Kopenhag Kriterlerinin gerisinde kalmistir. Bu makale, kismen bagimsizligini kazanan Macaristan Merkez Bankasinin zaman içerisinde nasil AB Kriterleri ile uyumlu hale geldigini, iç ve dis politik aktörlerin karsilikli etkilesimi üzerinden tartisilmaktadir.
Sample Text	Uluslararasi Iliskiler / International Relations, 1901-01, Vol.9 (36), p.129-148

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University of Washington

It takes two to tango: the role of the European Union and domestic governments in the making of Central Bank reform in Hungary

Author Civelekoglu, Ilke

Subject Autonomy, Central banks, Economic reform, EU accession, Europe, European Union, Governance, Hungary

Type Periodical

Language Turkish

Digital Yes

Manuscript No

Library University of Washington

Library Asset ID ISSN: 1304-7310, EISSN: 1304-7310

Record ID cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1418128339

Library Location Check availability & request options

Date Uluslararasi Iliskiler / International Relations, 1901-01, Vol.9 (36), p.129-148

Notes ABSTRACT IN ENGLISH: This article addresses how the Hungarian Central Bank gained autonomy in its operations from ruling politicians. While stressing the substantial influence of external actors in exercise of this reform, the article also demonstrates the limits of external influence by shedding light on the domestic political costs of this reform. The high costs of central bank reform in the calculations of the ruling politicians allowed the Central Bank of Hungary to gain partial operational autonomy in 1991, which fell short of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria for EU accession. The article discusses how partial reform furthered in Hungarian context by unpacking the interplay between domestic and external actors. // ABSTRACT IN TURKISH: Bu makale, Macaristan Merkez Bankasi'nin siyasi etkilerden kurtulus ve operasyonel bagimsizligini elde edis sürecini irdelemektedir. Makalede, reformun gerçeklesmesinde dis aktörlerin yadsinamaz etkisine vurgu yapilmakla beraber, bu etkinin sinirlari, özellikle iç siyasette bu reforma nasil bakildiginin alti çizilerek tartisilmaktadir. Macaristan Merkez Bankasi reformu, iktidardaki siyasetçiler açisindan siyasi bedelinin yüksek olmasi sebebi ile 1991 yilinda kismen gerçeklemis ve böylelikle Macaristan Merkez Bankasi, Avrupa Birligine (AB) üyelik için gerekli Kopenhag Kriterlerinin gerisinde kalmistir. Bu makale, kismen bagimsizligini kazanan Macaristan Merkez Bankasinin zaman içerisinde nasil AB Kriterleri ile uyumlu hale geldigini, iç ve dis politik aktörlerin karsilikli etkilesimi üzerinden tartisilmaktadir.

Sample Text Uluslararasi Iliskiler / International Relations, 1901-01, Vol.9 (36), p.129-148