Author
Özener, Başak Altan
Publication Date
2020-06
Publication Place
-
MDPI
Subject
Differentiation, Durable goods, Monopoly, Pricing, Quality
Type
Periodical
Language
English
Digital
Yes
Manuscript
No
Library
Özyeğin University
Library Asset ID
2073-4336
Record ID
bd5f96de-f7f4-422f-bcce-225479239b7b
Library Location
Economics
Date
2020-06
Sample Text
We analyze a vertically differentiated market for an imperfectly durable good served by a monopolist in an infinite-horizon, discrete-time game. Our goal is to identify the Markov perfect stationary equilibria where the seller can maintain his monopoly power. We establish that the set of parameters supporting a monopoly outcome is larger when the seller offers different quality versions of the same product. Hence, our results suggest that, when the innate durability of a product is high, the seller should offer different quality versions of the product.
DOI
10.3390/g11020022
Cilt
11
