Author
Akın, Özlem, Coleman, N. S., Fons‐Rosen, C., Peydró, J.-L.
Publication Date
2021-09
Publication Place
-
Wiley
Subject
Bank bailouts, Insider trading, Political connections, Political economy in banking, TARP
Type
Periodical
Language
English
Digital
Yes
Manuscript
No
Library
Özyeğin University
Library Asset ID
0046-3892
Record ID
09b993c2-391d-433c-b7a8-003beec72007
Library Location
International Finance
Date
2021-09
Notes
Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness
Sample Text
We study insider trading behavior surrounding the largest bank bailout in history: Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). In politically connected banks, insider buying during the pre-TARP period is associated with increases in abnormal returns around bank-specific TARP announcement; for unconnected banks, trading and returns are uncorrelated. Results hold across insiders within the same bank and are stronger for finance-related government connections. Through a Freedom of Information Act request, we obtained the previously undisclosed TARP funds requested; the ratio of received to requested funds correlates both with abnormal returns and insider buying behavior in connected banks.
DOI
10.1111/fima.12292
Cilt
50
