Author
Aktunç, Mahir Emrah
Publication Date
2014-12
Publication Place
-
Springer Science+Business Media
Subject
fMRI Datum, Active Voxels, Probabilistic Brain Atlas, fMRI Data Set, Preprocessed fMRI Datum, Participant’s Brain, Raw fMRI Datum, fMRI Signal, fMRI Experiment, Auxiliary Assumption, Caudate Nucleus, Episodic Memory, Nearby Voxels, Internal Capsule
Type
Periodical
Language
English
Digital
Yes
Manuscript
No
Library
Özyeğin University
Library Asset ID
1878-5166
Record ID
9f0a268a-b974-4c79-b3b6-213c69b3d151
Library Location
Psychology
Date
2014-12
Sample Text
Duhem’s problem arises especially in scientific contexts where the tools and procedures of measurement and analysis are numerous and complex. Several philosophers of cognitive science have cited its manifestations in fMRI as grounds for skepticism regarding the epistemic value of neuroimaging. To address these Duhemian arguments for skepticism, I offer an alternative approach based on Deborah Mayo’s error-statistical account in which Duhem's problem is more fruitfully approached in terms of error probabilities. This is illustrated in examples such as the use of probabilistic brain atlases, comparison of different preprocessing protocols with respect to their error characteristics, and statistical modeling of fMRI data. These examples demonstrate the ways in which we can better understand and formulate the general methodological problem and direct the way toward alternative approaches to neuroimaging in philosophy of cognitive science, in which we can be more balanced and productive in our scrutiny of the epistemic value of neuroimaging studies.
DOI
10.1007/s13164-014-0186-3
Cilt
5
