Author
Caskurlu, B., Ekici, Özgün, Kizilkaya, F. E.
Publication Date
2022-02
Publication Place
-
Cambridge University Press
Subject
Coalition structures, Existence of equilibrium, Resource selection games
Type
Periodical
Language
English
Digital
Yes
Manuscript
No
Library
Özyeğin University
Library Asset ID
0960-1295
Record ID
692e1804-23e7-41e5-8301-3632db293a3e
Library Location
Economics
Date
2022-02
Notes
TÜBİTAK
Sample Text
In a strategic-form game, a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents (or players) benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can be defined by considering various restrictions on coalition formation. For instance, in a Nash equilibrium, it is assumed that viable coalitions are singletons, and in a super strong equilibrium, it is assumed that every coalition is viable. Restrictions on coalition formation can be justified by communication limitations, coordination problems, or institutional constraints. In this paper, inspired by social structures in various real-life scenarios, we introduce certain restrictions on coalition formation, and on their basis, we introduce a number of equilibrium notions. As an application, we study our equilibrium notions in resource selection games (RSGs), and we present a complete set of existence and nonexistence results for general RSGs and their important special cases.
DOI
10.1017/S0960129522000214
Cilt
32
