Author
Ekici, Ozgun
Publication Date
2024-05
Publication Place
-
Econometric Society
Subject
D82, D63, D61, C78, Top trading cycles, Individually rational, Strategy-proof, Pair efficient, Indivisible object
Type
Periodical
Language
English
Digital
Yes
Manuscript
No
Library
Özyeğin University
Library Asset ID
1933-6837
Record ID
72b4e08b-abf9-43fa-8f07-a4ecf918324f
Library Location
Economics
Date
2024-05
Sample Text
We revisit the classical object reallocation problem under strict preferences. When attention is constrained to the set of Pareto-efficient rules, it is known that top trading cycles (TTC) is the only rule that is strategy-proof and individually rational. We relax this constraint and consider pair efficiency. A rule is pair-efficient if it never induces an allocation at which a pair of agents gain from trading their assigned objects. Remarkably, even in the larger set of pair-efficient rules, we find that TTC is still the only rule that is strategy-proof and individually rational. Our characterization result gives strong support to the use of TTC in object reallocation problems.
DOI
10.3982/TE5471
Cilt
19
