Author
Young, K. L., Yağcı, Alper H.
Publication Date
2019-05-04
Publication Place
-
Taylor & Francis
Subject
Finance, Regulation, Public opinion, Attitudes, Financial crisis, American politics
Type
Periodical
Language
English
Digital
Yes
Manuscript
No
Library
Özyeğin University
Library Asset ID
1356-3467
Record ID
8b268220-a5f9-44b9-adf6-9a56b545773b
Library Location
International Relations
Date
2019-05-04
Sample Text
Within the literature on financial governance a key question is why the 2008 financial crisis did not elicit a stronger regulatory reaction than it did - the 'post-crisis stasis' puzzle. We explore a neglected dimension of this puzzle: public attitudes toward financial regulation. Using a variety of survey data of the US public we find that there was persistent support for stronger financial regulation following the crisis, even support for radical reform in some instances, and support continued even after regulatory reform had been enacted. Despite such general sentiment, however, at nearly every stage public attitudes were highly conditional on partisan affiliation - a hugely consequential detail that meant that demand for reform was not channelled into more stringent policy but rather into a highly partisan, status quo protecting political machinery. Our analysis challenges notions of US public attitudes as either conservative in orientation or placated through modest reform, but also highlights the importance of domestic political constraints in shaping financial reform options despite majoritarian support for more robust reform.
DOI
10.1080/13563467.2018.1446923
Cilt
24
