Author
Caskurlu, B., Ekici, Özgün, Kızılkaya, F. E.
Publication Date
2021
Publication Place
-
Springer
Type
Document
Language
English
Digital
Yes
Manuscript
No
Library
Özyeğin University
Library Asset ID
978-303089542-6
Record ID
0d0a599f-c60d-4cfc-8dc4-bc22b6ae8aa9
Library Location
Economics
Date
2021
Notes
TÜBİTAK
Sample Text
We study the subclass of singleton congestion games in which there are identical resources with increasing cost functions. In this domain, we prove that there always exists an outcome that is resilient to weakly-improving deviations by singletons (i.e., the outcome is a Nash equilibrium), by the grand coalition (i.e., the outcome is Pareto efficient), and by coalitions with respect to an a priori given partition coalition structure (i.e., the outcome is a partition equilibrium). To our knowledge, this is the strongest existence guarantee in the literature on congestion games when weakly-improving deviations are considered. Our proof technique gives the false impression of a potential function argument but it is a novel application of proof by contradiction.
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-89543-3_4
Cilt
13025
