Author
Tehrani, M. N., Uysal, Murat
Publication Date
2011
Publication Place
-
IEEE
Subject
Spectrum trading, Cognitive radio networks, Vickrey-Clarck-Grove mechanism, Channel allocation, Truthtelling
Type
Document
Language
English
Digital
Yes
Manuscript
No
Library
Özyeğin University
Library Asset ID
1536-1276
Record ID
f78a2536-6256-46f9-bf43-0de51e3182fb
Library Location
Electrical & Electronics Engineering
Date
2011
Notes
Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription.
Sample Text
In this paper, we investigate spectrum trading via auction approach for cognitive radio networks. We consider a realistic valuation function in terms of different parameters for secondary users (SUs), and propose an efficient concurrent Vickrey-Clarke-Grove mechanism for non-identical channel allocation in two different scenarios. In the first scenario, SUs can bid for a single channel while in the other one, SUs can bid for a bundle of two channels. Our numerical results demonstrate significant revenue increase for the auctioneer and bidders in comparison with the conventional auction mechanisms.
DOI
10.1109/PIMRC.2011.6139992
