Cooperation and trust in the presence of bias

Title Cooperation and trust in the presence of bias
Author Şensoy, Murat
Publication Date: 2014
Subject Multi agent systems
Type Document
Language English
Digital Yes
Manuscript No
Library: Özyeğin University
Library Asset ID 1613-0073
Record ID 25ded93a-66b0-4570-a741-a44847d092ea
Library Location Computer Science
Date 2014
Notes U.S. Army Research Laboratory ; TÜBİTAK
Sample Text Stereotypes may influence the attitudes that individuals have towards others. Stereotypes, therefore, represent biases toward and against others. In this paper, we formalise stereotypical bias within trust evaluations. Then, using the iterated prisoners’ dilemma game, we quantitatively analyse how cooperation and mutual trust between self-interested agents are affected by stereotypical bias. We present two key findings: i) stereotypical bias of one player may inhibit cooperation by creating incentives for others to defect, ii) even if only one of the players has a stereotypical bias, convergence of mutual trust between players may be strictly determined by the bias.
Editör Cohen, R., Falcone, R., Norman, T.
Cilt 1740
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Cooperation and trust in the presence of bias

Author Şensoy, Murat
Publication Date 2014
Subject Multi agent systems
Type Document
Language English
Digital Yes
Manuscript No
Library Özyeğin University
Library Asset ID 1613-0073
Record ID 25ded93a-66b0-4570-a741-a44847d092ea
Library Location Computer Science
Date 2014
Notes U.S. Army Research Laboratory ; TÜBİTAK
Sample Text Stereotypes may influence the attitudes that individuals have towards others. Stereotypes, therefore, represent biases toward and against others. In this paper, we formalise stereotypical bias within trust evaluations. Then, using the iterated prisoners’ dilemma game, we quantitatively analyse how cooperation and mutual trust between self-interested agents are affected by stereotypical bias. We present two key findings: i) stereotypical bias of one player may inhibit cooperation by creating incentives for others to defect, ii) even if only one of the players has a stereotypical bias, convergence of mutual trust between players may be strictly determined by the bias.
Editör Cohen, R., Falcone, R., Norman, T.
Cilt 1740
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