Author
Caskurlu, B., Ekici, Özgün, Kizilkaya, F. E.
Publication Date
2020
Publication Place
-
Springer
Type
Document
Language
English
Digital
Yes
Manuscript
No
Library
Özyeğin University
Library Asset ID
978-303059266-0
Record ID
041acb3a-5201-4a3a-9947-7c2721d08cc8
Library Location
Economics
Date
2020
Sample Text
In a strategic form game, a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can be defined by considering various restrictions on coalition formation. In a Nash equilibrium, for instance, the assumption is that viable coalitions are singletons, and in a super strong equilibrium, every coalition is viable. Restrictions on coalition formation can be justified by communication, coordination or institutional constraints. In this paper, inspired by social structures in various real-life scenarios, we introduce certain restrictions on coalition formation, and on their basis, we introduce a number of equilibrium notions. We study our equilibrium notions in resource selection games (RSGs), and we present a complete set of existence and non-existence results for general RSGs and their important special cases.
Editör
Chen, J., Feng, Q., Xu, J.
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-59267-7_23
Cilt
12337
