On singleton congestion games with resilience against collusion

Name: On singleton congestion games with resilience against collusion
Author: Caskurlu, B., Ekici, Özgün, Kızılkaya, F. E.

İsim	On singleton congestion games with resilience against collusion
Yazar	Caskurlu, B., Ekici, Özgün, Kızılkaya, F. E.
Basım Tarihi:	2021
Basım Yeri	- Springer
Tür	Belge
Dil	İngilizce
Dijital	Evet
Yazma	Hayır
Kütüphane:	Özyeğin Üniversitesi
Demirbaş Numarası	978-303089542-6
Kayıt Numarası	0d0a599f-c60d-4cfc-8dc4-bc22b6ae8aa9
Lokasyon	Economics
Tarih	2021
Notlar	TÜBİTAK
Örnek Metin	We study the subclass of singleton congestion games in which there are identical resources with increasing cost functions. In this domain, we prove that there always exists an outcome that is resilient to weakly-improving deviations by singletons (i.e., the outcome is a Nash equilibrium), by the grand coalition (i.e., the outcome is Pareto efficient), and by coalitions with respect to an a priori given partition coalition structure (i.e., the outcome is a partition equilibrium). To our knowledge, this is the strongest existence guarantee in the literature on congestion games when weakly-improving deviations are considered. Our proof technique gives the false impression of a potential function argument but it is a novel application of proof by contradiction.
DOI	10.1007/978-3-030-89543-3_4
Cilt	13025

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Özyeğin Üniversitesi

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On singleton congestion games with resilience against collusion

Yazar Caskurlu, B., Ekici, Özgün, Kızılkaya, F. E.

Basım Tarihi 2021

Basım Yeri - Springer

Tür Belge

Dil İngilizce

Dijital Evet

Yazma Hayır

Kütüphane Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Demirbaş Numarası 978-303089542-6

Kayıt Numarası 0d0a599f-c60d-4cfc-8dc4-bc22b6ae8aa9

Lokasyon Economics

Tarih 2021

Notlar TÜBİTAK

Örnek Metin We study the subclass of singleton congestion games in which there are identical resources with increasing cost functions. In this domain, we prove that there always exists an outcome that is resilient to weakly-improving deviations by singletons (i.e., the outcome is a Nash equilibrium), by the grand coalition (i.e., the outcome is Pareto efficient), and by coalitions with respect to an a priori given partition coalition structure (i.e., the outcome is a partition equilibrium). To our knowledge, this is the strongest existence guarantee in the literature on congestion games when weakly-improving deviations are considered. Our proof technique gives the false impression of a potential function argument but it is a novel application of proof by contradiction.

DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-89543-3_4

Cilt 13025