Spectrum trading for non-identical channel allocation in cognitive radio networks

Name: Spectrum trading for non-identical channel allocation in cognitive radio networks
Author: Tehrani, M. N., Uysal, Murat

İsim	Spectrum trading for non-identical channel allocation in cognitive radio networks
Yazar	Tehrani, M. N., Uysal, Murat
Basım Tarihi:	2011
Basım Yeri	- IEEE
Konu	Spectrum trading, Cognitive radio networks, Vickrey-Clarck-Grove mechanism, Channel allocation, Truthtelling
Tür	Belge
Dil	İngilizce
Dijital	Evet
Yazma	Hayır
Kütüphane:	Özyeğin Üniversitesi
Demirbaş Numarası	1536-1276
Kayıt Numarası	f78a2536-6256-46f9-bf43-0de51e3182fb
Lokasyon	Electrical & Electronics Engineering
Tarih	2011
Notlar	Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription.
Örnek Metin	In this paper, we investigate spectrum trading via auction approach for cognitive radio networks. We consider a realistic valuation function in terms of different parameters for secondary users (SUs), and propose an efficient concurrent Vickrey-Clarke-Grove mechanism for non-identical channel allocation in two different scenarios. In the first scenario, SUs can bid for a single channel while in the other one, SUs can bid for a bundle of two channels. Our numerical results demonstrate significant revenue increase for the auctioneer and bidders in comparison with the conventional auction mechanisms.
DOI	10.1109/PIMRC.2011.6139992

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Spectrum trading for non-identical channel allocation in cognitive radio networks

Yazar Tehrani, M. N., Uysal, Murat

Basım Tarihi 2011

Basım Yeri - IEEE

Konu Spectrum trading, Cognitive radio networks, Vickrey-Clarck-Grove mechanism, Channel allocation, Truthtelling

Tür Belge

Dil İngilizce

Dijital Evet

Yazma Hayır

Kütüphane Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Demirbaş Numarası 1536-1276

Kayıt Numarası f78a2536-6256-46f9-bf43-0de51e3182fb

Lokasyon Electrical & Electronics Engineering

Tarih 2011

Notlar Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription.

Örnek Metin In this paper, we investigate spectrum trading via auction approach for cognitive radio networks. We consider a realistic valuation function in terms of different parameters for secondary users (SUs), and propose an efficient concurrent Vickrey-Clarke-Grove mechanism for non-identical channel allocation in two different scenarios. In the first scenario, SUs can bid for a single channel while in the other one, SUs can bid for a bundle of two channels. Our numerical results demonstrate significant revenue increase for the auctioneer and bidders in comparison with the conventional auction mechanisms.

DOI 10.1109/PIMRC.2011.6139992