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An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism

İsim	An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism
Yazar	Ekici, Özgün, Kesten, O.
Basım Tarihi:	2016-08
Basım Yeri	- Springer Science+Business Media
Konu	Random assignment, Probabilistic serial, Equilibrium, Nash Equilibrium, Ordinal Nash Equilibrium, Strong ordinal Nash Equilibrium, Ordinal efficiency, Envy-freeness
Tür	Süreli Yayın
Dil	İngilizce
Dijital	Evet
Yazma	Hayır
Kütüphane:	Özyeğin Üniversitesi
Demirbaş Numarası	1432-1270
Kayıt Numarası	54fd5bc6-c77c-4d4b-b271-4a05b9a5f8ad
Lokasyon	Economics
Tarih	2016-08
Notlar	Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription.
Örnek Metin	The prominent mechanism of the recent literature in the assignment problem is the probabilistic serial (PS). Under PS, the truthful (preference) proÖle always constitutes an ordinal Nash Equilibrium, inducing a random assignment that satisÖes the appealing ordinal e¢ ciency and envy-freeness properties. We show that both properties may fail to be satisÖed by a random assignment induced in an ordinal Nash Equilibrium where one or more agents are non-truthful. Worse still, the truthful proÖle may not constitute a Nash Equilibrium, and every non-truthful proÖle that constitutes a Nash Equilibrium may lead to a random assignment which is not ordinally e¢ cient, not even weakly envy-free, and which admits an ex-post ine¢ cient decomposition. A strong ordinal Nash Equilibrium may not exist, but when it exists, any proÖle that constitutes a strong ordinal Nash Equilibrium induces the random assignment induced under the truthful proÖle. The results of our equilibrium analysis of PS call for caution when implementing it in small assignment problems.
DOI	10.1007/s00182-015-0475-9

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Özyeğin Üniversitesi

An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism

Yazar Ekici, Özgün, Kesten, O.

Basım Tarihi 2016-08

Basım Yeri - Springer Science+Business Media

Konu Random assignment, Probabilistic serial, Equilibrium, Nash Equilibrium, Ordinal Nash Equilibrium, Strong ordinal Nash Equilibrium, Ordinal efficiency, Envy-freeness

Tür Süreli Yayın

Dil İngilizce

Dijital Evet

Yazma Hayır

Kütüphane Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Demirbaş Numarası 1432-1270

Kayıt Numarası 54fd5bc6-c77c-4d4b-b271-4a05b9a5f8ad

Lokasyon Economics

Tarih 2016-08

Notlar Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription.

Örnek Metin The prominent mechanism of the recent literature in the assignment problem is the probabilistic serial (PS). Under PS, the truthful (preference) proÖle always constitutes an ordinal Nash Equilibrium, inducing a random assignment that satisÖes the appealing ordinal e¢ ciency and envy-freeness properties. We show that both properties may fail to be satisÖed by a random assignment induced in an ordinal Nash Equilibrium where one or more agents are non-truthful. Worse still, the truthful proÖle may not constitute a Nash Equilibrium, and every non-truthful proÖle that constitutes a Nash Equilibrium may lead to a random assignment which is not ordinally e¢ cient, not even weakly envy-free, and which admits an ex-post ine¢ cient decomposition. A strong ordinal Nash Equilibrium may not exist, but when it exists, any proÖle that constitutes a strong ordinal Nash Equilibrium induces the random assignment induced under the truthful proÖle. The results of our equilibrium analysis of PS call for caution when implementing it in small assignment problems.

DOI 10.1007/s00182-015-0475-9