Political connections and informed trading: Evidence from TARP

Name: Political connections and informed trading: Evidence from TARP
Author: Akın, Özlem, Coleman, N. S., Fons‐Rosen, C., Peydró, J.-L.

İsim	Political connections and informed trading: Evidence from TARP
Yazar	Akın, Özlem, Coleman, N. S., Fons‐Rosen, C., Peydró, J.-L.
Basım Tarihi:	2021-09
Basım Yeri	- Wiley
Konu	Bank bailouts, Insider trading, Political connections, Political economy in banking, TARP
Tür	Süreli Yayın
Dil	İngilizce
Dijital	Evet
Yazma	Hayır
Kütüphane:	Özyeğin Üniversitesi
Demirbaş Numarası	0046-3892
Kayıt Numarası	09b993c2-391d-433c-b7a8-003beec72007
Lokasyon	International Finance
Tarih	2021-09
Notlar	Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness
Örnek Metin	We study insider trading behavior surrounding the largest bank bailout in history: Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). In politically connected banks, insider buying during the pre-TARP period is associated with increases in abnormal returns around bank-specific TARP announcement; for unconnected banks, trading and returns are uncorrelated. Results hold across insiders within the same bank and are stronger for finance-related government connections. Through a Freedom of Information Act request, we obtained the previously undisclosed TARP funds requested; the ratio of received to requested funds correlates both with abnormal returns and insider buying behavior in connected banks.
DOI	10.1111/fima.12292
Cilt	50

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Political connections and informed trading: Evidence from TARP

Yazar Akın, Özlem, Coleman, N. S., Fons‐Rosen, C., Peydró, J.-L.

Basım Tarihi 2021-09

Basım Yeri - Wiley

Konu Bank bailouts, Insider trading, Political connections, Political economy in banking, TARP

Tür Süreli Yayın

Dil İngilizce

Dijital Evet

Yazma Hayır

Kütüphane Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Demirbaş Numarası 0046-3892

Kayıt Numarası 09b993c2-391d-433c-b7a8-003beec72007

Lokasyon International Finance

Tarih 2021-09

Notlar Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness

Örnek Metin We study insider trading behavior surrounding the largest bank bailout in history: Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). In politically connected banks, insider buying during the pre-TARP period is associated with increases in abnormal returns around bank-specific TARP announcement; for unconnected banks, trading and returns are uncorrelated. Results hold across insiders within the same bank and are stronger for finance-related government connections. Through a Freedom of Information Act request, we obtained the previously undisclosed TARP funds requested; the ratio of received to requested funds correlates both with abnormal returns and insider buying behavior in connected banks.

DOI 10.1111/fima.12292

Cilt 50