Dynamic moral hazard with sequential tasks

Name: Dynamic moral hazard with sequential tasks
Author: Özener, Başak Altan

İsim	Dynamic moral hazard with sequential tasks
Yazar	Özener, Başak Altan
Basım Tarihi:	2019-10
Basım Yeri	- Elsevier
Konu	Moral hazard, Sequential tasks, Optimal contract
Tür	Süreli Yayın
Dil	İngilizce
Dijital	Evet
Yazma	Hayır
Kütüphane:	Özyeğin Üniversitesi
Demirbaş Numarası	0165-1765
Kayıt Numarası	57eb4ce2-f149-4bff-b275-e03aaa4950c6
Lokasyon	Economics
Tarih	2019-10
Örnek Metin	We study a sequential agency problem with hidden actions in an infinite horizon dynamic setting. The principal has a project that requires completion of two sequential tasks where the predecessor must be finished before the successor can be started. We characterize the efficient outcome as well as the optimal full commitment contract.
DOI	10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108606
Cilt	183

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Dynamic moral hazard with sequential tasks

Yazar Özener, Başak Altan

Basım Tarihi 2019-10

Basım Yeri - Elsevier

Konu Moral hazard, Sequential tasks, Optimal contract

Tür Süreli Yayın

Dil İngilizce

Dijital Evet

Yazma Hayır

Kütüphane Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Demirbaş Numarası 0165-1765

Kayıt Numarası 57eb4ce2-f149-4bff-b275-e03aaa4950c6

Lokasyon Economics

Tarih 2019-10

Örnek Metin We study a sequential agency problem with hidden actions in an infinite horizon dynamic setting. The principal has a project that requires completion of two sequential tasks where the predecessor must be finished before the successor can be started. We characterize the efficient outcome as well as the optimal full commitment contract.

DOI 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108606

Cilt 183