On existence of equilibrium under social coalition structures

Name: On existence of equilibrium under social coalition structures
Author: Caskurlu, B., Ekici, Özgün, Kizilkaya, F. E.

İsim	On existence of equilibrium under social coalition structures
Yazar	Caskurlu, B., Ekici, Özgün, Kizilkaya, F. E.
Basım Tarihi:	2022-02
Basım Yeri	- Cambridge University Press
Konu	Coalition structures, Existence of equilibrium, Resource selection games
Tür	Süreli Yayın
Dil	İngilizce
Dijital	Evet
Yazma	Hayır
Kütüphane:	Özyeğin Üniversitesi
Demirbaş Numarası	0960-1295
Kayıt Numarası	692e1804-23e7-41e5-8301-3632db293a3e
Lokasyon	Economics
Tarih	2022-02
Notlar	TÜBİTAK
Örnek Metin	In a strategic-form game, a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents (or players) benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can be defined by considering various restrictions on coalition formation. For instance, in a Nash equilibrium, it is assumed that viable coalitions are singletons, and in a super strong equilibrium, it is assumed that every coalition is viable. Restrictions on coalition formation can be justified by communication limitations, coordination problems, or institutional constraints. In this paper, inspired by social structures in various real-life scenarios, we introduce certain restrictions on coalition formation, and on their basis, we introduce a number of equilibrium notions. As an application, we study our equilibrium notions in resource selection games (RSGs), and we present a complete set of existence and nonexistence results for general RSGs and their important special cases.
DOI	10.1017/S0960129522000214
Cilt	32

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On existence of equilibrium under social coalition structures

Yazar Caskurlu, B., Ekici, Özgün, Kizilkaya, F. E.

Basım Tarihi 2022-02

Basım Yeri - Cambridge University Press

Konu Coalition structures, Existence of equilibrium, Resource selection games

Tür Süreli Yayın

Dil İngilizce

Dijital Evet

Yazma Hayır

Kütüphane Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Demirbaş Numarası 0960-1295

Kayıt Numarası 692e1804-23e7-41e5-8301-3632db293a3e

Lokasyon Economics

Tarih 2022-02

Notlar TÜBİTAK

Örnek Metin In a strategic-form game, a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents (or players) benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can be defined by considering various restrictions on coalition formation. For instance, in a Nash equilibrium, it is assumed that viable coalitions are singletons, and in a super strong equilibrium, it is assumed that every coalition is viable. Restrictions on coalition formation can be justified by communication limitations, coordination problems, or institutional constraints. In this paper, inspired by social structures in various real-life scenarios, we introduce certain restrictions on coalition formation, and on their basis, we introduce a number of equilibrium notions. As an application, we study our equilibrium notions in resource selection games (RSGs), and we present a complete set of existence and nonexistence results for general RSGs and their important special cases.

DOI 10.1017/S0960129522000214

Cilt 32