Foreign acquisition and credit risk: Evidence from the U.S. CDS market

Name: Foreign acquisition and credit risk: Evidence from the U.S. CDS market
Author: Yılmaz, Ümit

İsim	Foreign acquisition and credit risk: Evidence from the U.S. CDS market
Yazar	Yılmaz, Ümit
Basım Tarihi:	2023-06-17
Basım Yeri	- Cambridge University Press
Tür	Süreli Yayın
Dil	İngilizce
Dijital	Evet
Yazma	Hayır
Kütüphane:	Özyeğin Üniversitesi
Demirbaş Numarası	0022-1090
Kayıt Numarası	986bc33e-5dce-49b3-a91e-bb11c7be370a
Lokasyon	International Finance
Tarih	2023-06-17
Örnek Metin	This article empirically analyzes the effect of foreign block acquisitions on U.S. target firms' credit risk as measured by their credit default swap (CDS) spreads. Foreign block purchases lead to a greater increase in the target firms' CDS premia post-acquisition compared to domestic block purchases. This effect is stronger when foreign owners are geographically and culturally more distant, and when they obtain majority control. The findings are consistent with an asymmetric information hypothesis, in which foreign owners are less effective monitors due to information barriers.
DOI	10.1017/S0022109022000035
Cilt	58

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Foreign acquisition and credit risk: Evidence from the U.S. CDS market

Yazar Yılmaz, Ümit

Basım Tarihi 2023-06-17

Basım Yeri - Cambridge University Press

Tür Süreli Yayın

Dil İngilizce

Dijital Evet

Yazma Hayır

Kütüphane Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Demirbaş Numarası 0022-1090

Kayıt Numarası 986bc33e-5dce-49b3-a91e-bb11c7be370a

Lokasyon International Finance

Tarih 2023-06-17

Örnek Metin This article empirically analyzes the effect of foreign block acquisitions on U.S. target firms' credit risk as measured by their credit default swap (CDS) spreads. Foreign block purchases lead to a greater increase in the target firms' CDS premia post-acquisition compared to domestic block purchases. This effect is stronger when foreign owners are geographically and culturally more distant, and when they obtain majority control. The findings are consistent with an asymmetric information hypothesis, in which foreign owners are less effective monitors due to information barriers.

DOI 10.1017/S0022109022000035

Cilt 58