Corporate sustainability interactions: A game theoretical approach to sustainability decisions

Name: Corporate sustainability interactions: A game theoretical approach to sustainability decisions
Author: Soytaş, Mehmet Ali, Uşar, Damla Durak, Denizel, M.

İsim	Corporate sustainability interactions: A game theoretical approach to sustainability decisions
Yazar	Soytaş, Mehmet Ali, Uşar, Damla Durak, Denizel, M.
Basım Tarihi:	2019-12
Basım Yeri	- Elsevier
Konu	Game theory, Corporate sustainability, Competition, Spillovers, Stackelberg game
Tür	Süreli Yayın
Dil	İngilizce
Dijital	Evet
Yazma	Hayır
Kütüphane:	Özyeğin Üniversitesi
Demirbaş Numarası	0925-5273
Kayıt Numarası	343e3331-e5ab-4bec-8ebd-6449207f6d27
Tarih	2019-12
Örnek Metin	Recent global developments lead companies to include into their strategic plans not only economic sustainability but environmental and social sustainability as well. Companies have been investing in environmental and social sustainability to meet stakeholder demand and/or regulatory demands. Considering this as a market mechanism, we view the sustainability actions of companies as interrelated strategic decisions and propose a Stackelberg game to model the effects of competition for sustainability and sustainability spillovers over the sustainability outcomes of companies. We provide equilibrium solutions for the one leader, two followers game over different intervals of competition levels and spillover rates. Using a numerical example, we observe how the sustainability investments and net benefits change as competition levels and spillover rates change and identify the competition-spillover regions, where each player invests the most and has the advantage in terms of benefit. We discuss implications for both the companies and the policy makers.
DOI	10.1016/j.ijpe.2019.05.008
Cilt	218

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Corporate sustainability interactions: A game theoretical approach to sustainability decisions

Yazar Soytaş, Mehmet Ali, Uşar, Damla Durak, Denizel, M.

Basım Tarihi 2019-12

Basım Yeri - Elsevier

Konu Game theory, Corporate sustainability, Competition, Spillovers, Stackelberg game

Tür Süreli Yayın

Dil İngilizce

Dijital Evet

Yazma Hayır

Kütüphane Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Demirbaş Numarası 0925-5273

Kayıt Numarası 343e3331-e5ab-4bec-8ebd-6449207f6d27

Tarih 2019-12

Örnek Metin Recent global developments lead companies to include into their strategic plans not only economic sustainability but environmental and social sustainability as well. Companies have been investing in environmental and social sustainability to meet stakeholder demand and/or regulatory demands. Considering this as a market mechanism, we view the sustainability actions of companies as interrelated strategic decisions and propose a Stackelberg game to model the effects of competition for sustainability and sustainability spillovers over the sustainability outcomes of companies. We provide equilibrium solutions for the one leader, two followers game over different intervals of competition levels and spillover rates. Using a numerical example, we observe how the sustainability investments and net benefits change as competition levels and spillover rates change and identify the competition-spillover regions, where each player invests the most and has the advantage in terms of benefit. We discuss implications for both the companies and the policy makers.

DOI 10.1016/j.ijpe.2019.05.008

Cilt 218