Does risk matter in CEO compensation contracting? Evidence from US restaurant industry

Name: Does risk matter in CEO compensation contracting? Evidence from US restaurant industry
Author: Özdemir, Özgür, Kizildag, M., Upneja, A.

İsim	Does risk matter in CEO compensation contracting? Evidence from US restaurant industry
Yazar	Özdemir, Özgür, Kizildag, M., Upneja, A.
Basım Tarihi:	2013-09
Basım Yeri	- Elsevier
Konu	CEO, Compensation, Firm risk, Restaurant industry
Tür	Süreli Yayın
Dil	İngilizce
Dijital	Evet
Yazma	Hayır
Kütüphane:	Özyeğin Üniversitesi
Demirbaş Numarası	1873-4693
Kayıt Numarası	8fa5f37e-2032-4df7-8428-e3648e01abac
Lokasyon	Hotel Management
Tarih	2013-09
Örnek Metin	The structure of compensation packages of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) has been a significant research interest for researchers across various disciplines. In this paper, we examine a unique relationship between CEO compensation and risk (systematic risk) in the US restaurant industry. Our research question stems from the assumption that CEOs must be rewarded with a higher incentive-based compensation in high-risk profile restaurant companies in order to motivate them to perform in their full potential for mutual benefits of the CEO and shareowners. Furthermore, we investigate whether firm risk moderates the relationship between firm performance and CEO total compensation controlling for the firm size and CEO ownership. We draw our sample firms from the US restaurant industry. Findings of our study suggest that firm risk induces a higher proportion of incentive-based compensation for restaurant companies’ CEOs, and firm risk does not seem to moderate the relationship between pay and performance in the restaurant industry.
DOI	10.1016/j.ijhm.2012.11.012
Cilt	34

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Does risk matter in CEO compensation contracting? Evidence from US restaurant industry

Yazar Özdemir, Özgür, Kizildag, M., Upneja, A.

Basım Tarihi 2013-09

Basım Yeri - Elsevier

Konu CEO, Compensation, Firm risk, Restaurant industry

Tür Süreli Yayın

Dil İngilizce

Dijital Evet

Yazma Hayır

Kütüphane Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Demirbaş Numarası 1873-4693

Kayıt Numarası 8fa5f37e-2032-4df7-8428-e3648e01abac

Lokasyon Hotel Management

Tarih 2013-09

Örnek Metin The structure of compensation packages of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) has been a significant research interest for researchers across various disciplines. In this paper, we examine a unique relationship between CEO compensation and risk (systematic risk) in the US restaurant industry. Our research question stems from the assumption that CEOs must be rewarded with a higher incentive-based compensation in high-risk profile restaurant companies in order to motivate them to perform in their full potential for mutual benefits of the CEO and shareowners. Furthermore, we investigate whether firm risk moderates the relationship between firm performance and CEO total compensation controlling for the firm size and CEO ownership. We draw our sample firms from the US restaurant industry. Findings of our study suggest that firm risk induces a higher proportion of incentive-based compensation for restaurant companies’ CEOs, and firm risk does not seem to moderate the relationship between pay and performance in the restaurant industry.

DOI 10.1016/j.ijhm.2012.11.012

Cilt 34