Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants

Name: Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants
Author: Ekici, Özgün

İsim	Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants
Yazar	Ekici, Özgün
Basım Tarihi:	2020-08
Basım Yeri	- Elsevier
Konu	House allocation with existing tenants, House allocation, Housing market, Equivalence of mechanisms
Tür	Süreli Yayın
Dil	İngilizce
Dijital	Evet
Yazma	Hayır
Kütüphane:	Özyeğin Üniversitesi
Demirbaş Numarası	0304-4068
Kayıt Numarası	58cb25eb-362d-4fb5-aa22-61cd48359481
Lokasyon	Economics
Tarih	2020-08
Örnek Metin	We study the house allocation problem with existing tenants: n houses (stand for "indivisible objects") are to be allocated to n agents; each agent needs exactly one house and has strict preferences; k houses are initially unowned; k agents initially do not own houses; the remaining n - k agents (the so-called "existing tenants") initially own the remaining n - k houses (each owns one). In this setting, we consider various randomized allocation rules under which voluntary participation of existing tenants is assured and the randomization procedure either treats agents equally or discriminates against some (or all) of the existing tenants. We obtain two equivalence results, which generalize the equivalence results in Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (1999) and Sonmez and Unver (2005).
DOI	10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.003
Cilt	89

Kaynağa git Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Aramaya Dön

Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Kaynağa git

Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants

Yazar Ekici, Özgün

Basım Tarihi 2020-08

Basım Yeri - Elsevier

Konu House allocation with existing tenants, House allocation, Housing market, Equivalence of mechanisms

Tür Süreli Yayın

Dil İngilizce

Dijital Evet

Yazma Hayır

Kütüphane Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Demirbaş Numarası 0304-4068

Kayıt Numarası 58cb25eb-362d-4fb5-aa22-61cd48359481

Lokasyon Economics

Tarih 2020-08

Örnek Metin We study the house allocation problem with existing tenants: n houses (stand for "indivisible objects") are to be allocated to n agents; each agent needs exactly one house and has strict preferences; k houses are initially unowned; k agents initially do not own houses; the remaining n - k agents (the so-called "existing tenants") initially own the remaining n - k houses (each owns one). In this setting, we consider various randomized allocation rules under which voluntary participation of existing tenants is assured and the randomization procedure either treats agents equally or discriminates against some (or all) of the existing tenants. We obtain two equivalence results, which generalize the equivalence results in Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (1999) and Sonmez and Unver (2005).

DOI 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.003

Cilt 89