Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects

Name: Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects
Author: Ekici, Özgün

İsim	Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects
Yazar	Ekici, Özgün
Basım Tarihi:	2013-09
Basım Yeri	- Elsevier
Konu	Indivisible object allocation, House allocation with existing tenants, House allocation, Housing market, Reclaim-proof, Competitive allocation, Core
Tür	Süreli Yayın
Dil	İngilizce
Dijital	Evet
Yazma	Hayır
Kütüphane:	Özyeğin Üniversitesi
Demirbaş Numarası	0899-8256
Kayıt Numarası	dfa7304b-0b4a-4078-8112-ec596406168b
Lokasyon	Economics
Tarih	2013-09
Notlar	Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription.
Örnek Metin	We study desirability axioms imposed on allocations in indivisible object allocation problems. The existing axioms in the literature are various conditions of robustness to blocking coalitions with respect to agentsʼ ex ante (individual rationality and group rationality) and ex post (Pareto efficiency) endowments. We introduce a stringent axiom that encompasses and strengthens the existing ones. An allocation is reclaim-proof if it is robust to blocking coalitions with respect to any conceivable interim endowments of agents. This is an appealing property in dynamic settings, where the assignments prescribed by an allocation to be implemented need to be made in multiple rounds rather than all in one shot. We show that an allocation is reclaim-proof if and only if it is induced by a YRMH–IGYT mechanism (introduced by Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 1999) and if and only if it is a competitive allocation.
DOI	10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.013
Cilt	81

Kaynağa git Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Aramaya Dön

Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Kaynağa git

Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects

Yazar Ekici, Özgün

Basım Tarihi 2013-09

Basım Yeri - Elsevier

Konu Indivisible object allocation, House allocation with existing tenants, House allocation, Housing market, Reclaim-proof, Competitive allocation, Core

Tür Süreli Yayın

Dil İngilizce

Dijital Evet

Yazma Hayır

Kütüphane Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Demirbaş Numarası 0899-8256

Kayıt Numarası dfa7304b-0b4a-4078-8112-ec596406168b

Lokasyon Economics

Tarih 2013-09

Notlar Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription.

Örnek Metin We study desirability axioms imposed on allocations in indivisible object allocation problems. The existing axioms in the literature are various conditions of robustness to blocking coalitions with respect to agentsʼ ex ante (individual rationality and group rationality) and ex post (Pareto efficiency) endowments. We introduce a stringent axiom that encompasses and strengthens the existing ones. An allocation is reclaim-proof if it is robust to blocking coalitions with respect to any conceivable interim endowments of agents. This is an appealing property in dynamic settings, where the assignments prescribed by an allocation to be implemented need to be made in multiple rounds rather than all in one shot. We show that an allocation is reclaim-proof if and only if it is induced by a YRMH–IGYT mechanism (introduced by Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 1999) and if and only if it is a competitive allocation.

DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.013

Cilt 81