Recovery decisions of a producer in a legislative disposal fee environment

Name: Recovery decisions of a producer in a legislative disposal fee environment
Author: Özdemir, Ö., Denizel, Meltem, Guide Jr., V. D. R.

İsim	Recovery decisions of a producer in a legislative disposal fee environment
Yazar	Özdemir, Ö., Denizel, Meltem, Guide Jr., V. D. R.
Basım Tarihi:	2012-01-16
Basım Yeri	- Elsevier
Konu	Environment, Extended producer responsibility (EPR) principle, Environmental legislation, Product recovery, Redesign
Tür	Süreli Yayın
Dil	İngilizce
Dijital	Evet
Yazma	Hayır
Kütüphane:	Özyeğin Üniversitesi
Demirbaş Numarası	0377-2217
Kayıt Numarası	92c36e29-23fa-4844-9eef-6417df71244a
Lokasyon	Industrial Engineering
Tarih	2012-01-16
Notlar	Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription.
Örnek Metin	The main objectives of the environmental legislation originating from extended producer responsibility (EPR) principle are to lead producers to undertake recovery initiatives for their end-of-use products and to promote environmentally desirable product design. It is still controversial whether current implementations of EPR principle are effective in attaining these objectives. This study seeks to answer the following questions: (1) What is the impact of EPR legislation on the product recovery decisions of producers? (2) How do the redesign opportunities (i.e., design for disassembly) affect the willingness of producers for product recovery? (3) How do the investment needs to start recovery practices and the reluctance of producers to allocate sufficient funds for this purpose affect the optimal recovery decisions? We use stylized economic models to represent the implementation in practice and solving our models we obtain closed form and numerical solutions that help us to see the impact of various parameters on the optimal decisions of a producer. Our findings indicate that redesign opportunities encourage producers for more recovery, however the reluctance of producers to cover the initial investments may substantially reduce the effectiveness of the legislation and the recovery amounts.
DOI	10.1016/j.ejor.2011.07.035
Cilt	216

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Recovery decisions of a producer in a legislative disposal fee environment

Yazar Özdemir, Ö., Denizel, Meltem, Guide Jr., V. D. R.

Basım Tarihi 2012-01-16

Basım Yeri - Elsevier

Konu Environment, Extended producer responsibility (EPR) principle, Environmental legislation, Product recovery, Redesign

Tür Süreli Yayın

Dil İngilizce

Dijital Evet

Yazma Hayır

Kütüphane Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Demirbaş Numarası 0377-2217

Kayıt Numarası 92c36e29-23fa-4844-9eef-6417df71244a

Lokasyon Industrial Engineering

Tarih 2012-01-16

Notlar Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription.

Örnek Metin The main objectives of the environmental legislation originating from extended producer responsibility (EPR) principle are to lead producers to undertake recovery initiatives for their end-of-use products and to promote environmentally desirable product design. It is still controversial whether current implementations of EPR principle are effective in attaining these objectives. This study seeks to answer the following questions: (1) What is the impact of EPR legislation on the product recovery decisions of producers? (2) How do the redesign opportunities (i.e., design for disassembly) affect the willingness of producers for product recovery? (3) How do the investment needs to start recovery practices and the reluctance of producers to allocate sufficient funds for this purpose affect the optimal recovery decisions? We use stylized economic models to represent the implementation in practice and solving our models we obtain closed form and numerical solutions that help us to see the impact of various parameters on the optimal decisions of a producer. Our findings indicate that redesign opportunities encourage producers for more recovery, however the reluctance of producers to cover the initial investments may substantially reduce the effectiveness of the legislation and the recovery amounts.

DOI 10.1016/j.ejor.2011.07.035

Cilt 216