Discrete-time average-cost mean-field games on Polish spaces

Name: Discrete-time average-cost mean-field games on Polish spaces
Author: Saldı, Naci

İsim	Discrete-time average-cost mean-field games on Polish spaces
Yazar	Saldı, Naci
Basım Tarihi:	2020
Basım Yeri	- TÜBİTAK
Konu	Mean-field games, Average cost, Approximate Nash equilibrium
Tür	Süreli Yayın
Dil	İngilizce
Dijital	Evet
Yazma	Hayır
Kütüphane:	Özyeğin Üniversitesi
Demirbaş Numarası	1300-0098
Kayıt Numarası	35df78cb-599a-4476-b382-0ef093446da5
Lokasyon	Natural and Mathematical Sciences
Tarih	2020
Notlar	TÜBİTAK
Örnek Metin	In stochastic dynamic games, when the number of players is sufficiently large and the interactions between agents depend on empirical state distribution, one way to approximate the original game is to introduce infinite-population limit of the problem. In the infinite population limit, a generic agent is faced with a so-called mean-field game. In this paper, we study discrete-time mean-field games with average-cost criteria. Using average cost optimality equation and Kakutani's fixed point theorem, we establish the existence of Nash equilibria for mean-field games under drift and minorization conditions on the dynamics of each agent. Then, we show that the equilibrium policy in the mean-field game, when adopted by each agent, is an approximate Nash equilibrium for the corresponding finite-agent game with sufficiently many agents.
DOI	10.3906/mat-1905-2
Cilt	44

Kaynağa git Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Aramaya Dön

Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Kaynağa git

Discrete-time average-cost mean-field games on Polish spaces

Yazar Saldı, Naci

Basım Tarihi 2020

Basım Yeri - TÜBİTAK

Konu Mean-field games, Average cost, Approximate Nash equilibrium

Tür Süreli Yayın

Dil İngilizce

Dijital Evet

Yazma Hayır

Kütüphane Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Demirbaş Numarası 1300-0098

Kayıt Numarası 35df78cb-599a-4476-b382-0ef093446da5

Lokasyon Natural and Mathematical Sciences

Tarih 2020

Notlar TÜBİTAK

Örnek Metin In stochastic dynamic games, when the number of players is sufficiently large and the interactions between agents depend on empirical state distribution, one way to approximate the original game is to introduce infinite-population limit of the problem. In the infinite population limit, a generic agent is faced with a so-called mean-field game. In this paper, we study discrete-time mean-field games with average-cost criteria. Using average cost optimality equation and Kakutani's fixed point theorem, we establish the existence of Nash equilibria for mean-field games under drift and minorization conditions on the dynamics of each agent. Then, we show that the equilibrium policy in the mean-field game, when adopted by each agent, is an approximate Nash equilibrium for the corresponding finite-agent game with sufficiently many agents.

DOI 10.3906/mat-1905-2

Cilt 44