Managerial discretion and efficiency of internal capital markets

Name: Managerial discretion and efficiency of internal capital markets
Author: Şahin, Cansu İskenderoğlu

İsim	Managerial discretion and efficiency of internal capital markets
Yazar	Şahin, Cansu İskenderoğlu
Basım Tarihi:	2021-10
Basım Yeri	- Elsevier
Konu	Internal capital markets, Antitakeover laws, Corporate investment, Allocation of resources, Agency problems
Tür	Süreli Yayın
Dil	İngilizce
Dijital	Evet
Yazma	Hayır
Kütüphane:	Özyeğin Üniversitesi
Demirbaş Numarası	0929-1199
Kayıt Numarası	6b2ae313-b24d-4911-be71-cfcdaadf8139
Lokasyon	International Finance
Tarih	2021-10
Örnek Metin	I use the staggered adoption of state-level antitakeover laws to provide causal evidence that managerial agency problems reduce the allocative efficiency of conglomerate firms. I find that increases in control slack following the passage of antitakeover laws reduces q-sensitivity of investment by 64%. The adverse impact of the laws appears mostly at conglomerate firms that benefited from disciplinary takeover threats prior to the passage of the laws, lacked alternative sources of pressure on management, or had the structural makings to fuel wasteful influence activities and power struggles among managers. These findings suggest that takeover threats impact the efficiency of resource allocation.
DOI	10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.102061
Cilt	70

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Managerial discretion and efficiency of internal capital markets

Yazar Şahin, Cansu İskenderoğlu

Basım Tarihi 2021-10

Basım Yeri - Elsevier

Konu Internal capital markets, Antitakeover laws, Corporate investment, Allocation of resources, Agency problems

Tür Süreli Yayın

Dil İngilizce

Dijital Evet

Yazma Hayır

Kütüphane Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Demirbaş Numarası 0929-1199

Kayıt Numarası 6b2ae313-b24d-4911-be71-cfcdaadf8139

Lokasyon International Finance

Tarih 2021-10

Örnek Metin I use the staggered adoption of state-level antitakeover laws to provide causal evidence that managerial agency problems reduce the allocative efficiency of conglomerate firms. I find that increases in control slack following the passage of antitakeover laws reduces q-sensitivity of investment by 64%. The adverse impact of the laws appears mostly at conglomerate firms that benefited from disciplinary takeover threats prior to the passage of the laws, lacked alternative sources of pressure on management, or had the structural makings to fuel wasteful influence activities and power struggles among managers. These findings suggest that takeover threats impact the efficiency of resource allocation.

DOI 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.102061

Cilt 70