Yazar
Şahin, Cansu İskenderoğlu
Basım Tarihi
2021-10
Basım Yeri
-
Elsevier
Konu
Internal capital markets, Antitakeover laws, Corporate investment, Allocation of resources, Agency problems
Tür
Süreli Yayın
Dil
İngilizce
Dijital
Evet
Yazma
Hayır
Kütüphane
Özyeğin Üniversitesi
Demirbaş Numarası
0929-1199
Kayıt Numarası
6b2ae313-b24d-4911-be71-cfcdaadf8139
Lokasyon
International Finance
Tarih
2021-10
Örnek Metin
I use the staggered adoption of state-level antitakeover laws to provide causal evidence that managerial agency problems reduce the allocative efficiency of conglomerate firms. I find that increases in control slack following the passage of antitakeover laws reduces q-sensitivity of investment by 64%. The adverse impact of the laws appears mostly at conglomerate firms that benefited from disciplinary takeover threats prior to the passage of the laws, lacked alternative sources of pressure on management, or had the structural makings to fuel wasteful influence activities and power struggles among managers. These findings suggest that takeover threats impact the efficiency of resource allocation.
DOI
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.102061
Cilt
70
