Delegation vs. control of component procurement under asymmetric cost information and simple contracts

Name: Delegation vs. control of component procurement under asymmetric cost information and simple contracts
Author: Kayış, Enis, Erhun, F., Plambeck, E. L.

İsim	Delegation vs. control of component procurement under asymmetric cost information and simple contracts
Yazar	Kayış, Enis, Erhun, F., Plambeck, E. L.
Basım Tarihi:	2013
Basım Yeri	- Informs
Konu	Multitier supply chain, Delegation, Control, Asymmetric information, Component procurement, Contract design, Price-only contracts, Quantity discount contracts, robust optimization
Tür	Süreli Yayın
Dil	İngilizce
Dijital	Evet
Yazma	Hayır
Kütüphane:	Özyeğin Üniversitesi
Demirbaş Numarası	1526-5498
Kayıt Numarası	35735cb6-bf07-4325-a72b-b2779728ebcd
Lokasyon	Industrial Engineering
Tarih	2013
Notlar	Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription.
Örnek Metin	A manufacturer must choose whether to delegate component procurement to her tier 1 supplier or control it directly. Because of information asymmetry about suppliers’ production costs and the use of simple quantity discount or price-only contracts, either delegation or control can yield substantially higher expected proﬁt for the manufacturer. Delegation tends to outperform control when (1) the manufacturer is uncertain about the tier 1 supplier’s cost and believes that it is likely to be high; (2) the manufacturer and the tier 1 supplier know the tier 2 supplier’s cost or at least that it will be high; (3) the manufacturer has an alternative to engaging the tier 1 and tier 2 suppliers, such as in-house production; and (4) the ﬁrms use price-only contracts as opposed to quantity discount contracts. These results shed light on practices observed in the electronics industry.
DOI	10.1287/msom.1120.0395
Cilt	15

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Delegation vs. control of component procurement under asymmetric cost information and simple contracts

Yazar Kayış, Enis, Erhun, F., Plambeck, E. L.

Basım Tarihi 2013

Basım Yeri - Informs

Konu Multitier supply chain, Delegation, Control, Asymmetric information, Component procurement, Contract design, Price-only contracts, Quantity discount contracts, robust optimization

Tür Süreli Yayın

Dil İngilizce

Dijital Evet

Yazma Hayır

Kütüphane Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Demirbaş Numarası 1526-5498

Kayıt Numarası 35735cb6-bf07-4325-a72b-b2779728ebcd

Lokasyon Industrial Engineering

Tarih 2013

Notlar Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription.

Örnek Metin A manufacturer must choose whether to delegate component procurement to her tier 1 supplier or control it directly. Because of information asymmetry about suppliers’ production costs and the use of simple quantity discount or price-only contracts, either delegation or control can yield substantially higher expected proﬁt for the manufacturer. Delegation tends to outperform control when (1) the manufacturer is uncertain about the tier 1 supplier’s cost and believes that it is likely to be high; (2) the manufacturer and the tier 1 supplier know the tier 2 supplier’s cost or at least that it will be high; (3) the manufacturer has an alternative to engaging the tier 1 and tier 2 suppliers, such as in-house production; and (4) the ﬁrms use price-only contracts as opposed to quantity discount contracts. These results shed light on practices observed in the electronics industry.

DOI 10.1287/msom.1120.0395

Cilt 15