A game theoretical approach for improving the operational efficiencies of less-than-truckload carriers through load exchanges

Name: A game theoretical approach for improving the operational efficiencies of less-than-truckload carriers through load exchanges
Author: Özener, Başak Altan, Özener, Okan Örsan

İsim	A game theoretical approach for improving the operational efficiencies of less-than-truckload carriers through load exchanges
Yazar	Özener, Başak Altan, Özener, Okan Örsan
Basım Tarihi:	2021-09
Basım Yeri	- Springer
Konu	Less-than-truckload shipping, Non-cooperative game theory, Load exchanges, Collaboration, Synergy
Tür	Süreli Yayın
Dil	İngilizce
Dijital	Evet
Yazma	Hayır
Kütüphane:	Özyeğin Üniversitesi
Demirbaş Numarası	1566-113X
Kayıt Numarası	05614f11-34a5-46cd-8e20-cba40464171b
Lokasyon	Economics, Industrial Engineering
Tarih	2021-09
Örnek Metin	Less-than-truckload (LTL) transportation offers fast, flexible and relatively low-cost transportation services to shippers. In order to cope with the effects of economic recessions, the LTL industry implemented ideas such as reducing excess capacity and increasing revenues through better yield management. In this paper, we extend these initiatives beyond the reach of individual carriers and propose a collaborative framework that facilitates load exchanges to reduce the operational costs. Even though collective solutions are proven to provide benefits to the participants by reducing the inefficiencies using a system-wide perspective, such solutions are often not attainable in real-life as the negotiating parties are seeking to maximize their individual profits rather than the overall profit and also they are unwilling to share confidential information. Therefore, a mechanism that enables collaboration among the carriers should account for the rationality of the individual participants and should require minimal information transfer between participants. Having this in mind, we propose a mechanism that facilities collaboration through a series of load exchange iterations and identifies an equilibrium among selfish carriers with limited information transfer among the participants. Our time-efficient mechanism can handle large instances with thousands of loads as well as provide significant benefits over the non-collaborative management of LTL networks.
DOI	10.1007/s11067-021-09536-7
Cilt	21

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A game theoretical approach for improving the operational efficiencies of less-than-truckload carriers through load exchanges

Yazar Özener, Başak Altan, Özener, Okan Örsan

Basım Tarihi 2021-09

Basım Yeri - Springer

Konu Less-than-truckload shipping, Non-cooperative game theory, Load exchanges, Collaboration, Synergy

Tür Süreli Yayın

Dil İngilizce

Dijital Evet

Yazma Hayır

Kütüphane Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Demirbaş Numarası 1566-113X

Kayıt Numarası 05614f11-34a5-46cd-8e20-cba40464171b

Lokasyon Economics, Industrial Engineering

Tarih 2021-09

Örnek Metin Less-than-truckload (LTL) transportation offers fast, flexible and relatively low-cost transportation services to shippers. In order to cope with the effects of economic recessions, the LTL industry implemented ideas such as reducing excess capacity and increasing revenues through better yield management. In this paper, we extend these initiatives beyond the reach of individual carriers and propose a collaborative framework that facilitates load exchanges to reduce the operational costs. Even though collective solutions are proven to provide benefits to the participants by reducing the inefficiencies using a system-wide perspective, such solutions are often not attainable in real-life as the negotiating parties are seeking to maximize their individual profits rather than the overall profit and also they are unwilling to share confidential information. Therefore, a mechanism that enables collaboration among the carriers should account for the rationality of the individual participants and should require minimal information transfer between participants. Having this in mind, we propose a mechanism that facilities collaboration through a series of load exchange iterations and identifies an equilibrium among selfish carriers with limited information transfer among the participants. Our time-efficient mechanism can handle large instances with thousands of loads as well as provide significant benefits over the non-collaborative management of LTL networks.

DOI 10.1007/s11067-021-09536-7

Cilt 21