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Cryptographic security concerns on timestamp sharing via a public channel in quantum-key-distribution systems

Title	Cryptographic security concerns on timestamp sharing via a public channel in quantum-key-distribution systems
Author	Pahalı, Melis, Durak, Kadir, Tefek, U.
Publication Date:	2022-07
Publication Place	- American Physical Society
Type	Periodical
Language	English
Digital	Yes
Manuscript	No
Library:	Özyeğin University
Library Asset ID	2469-9926
Record ID	3f9835c2-13f7-456c-ba5c-931ffa11bcf0
Library Location	Electrical & Electronics Engineering
Date	2022-07
Notes	TÜBİTAK
Sample Text	Quantum-key-distribution protocols are known to be vulnerable against a side channel attack that exploits the time difference in detectors' responses used to obtain key bits. The recommended solution against this timing side channel attack is to use a large time bin width instead of high-resolution timing information. A common notion is that using a large bin width reduces the resolution of detectors' responses, hence supposedly minimizes the information leakage to an eavesdropper. We challenge this conventional wisdom and demonstrate that increasing the bin width does not monotonically reduce the mutual information between the key bits and the eavesdropper's observation of detectors' responses. Instead of randomly increasing the bin width, it should be carefully chosen because the mutual information fluctuates with respect to the bin width. We also examine the effect of full width half maximums (FWHMs) of the detectors' responses on the mutual information and show that decreasing the FWHM increases the mutual information. Lastly, the start time of binning is also shown to be important in the binning process and the mutual information fluctuates periodically with respect to it.
DOI	10.1103/PhysRevA.106.012611
Cilt	106

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Cryptographic security concerns on timestamp sharing via a public channel in quantum-key-distribution systems

Author Pahalı, Melis, Durak, Kadir, Tefek, U.

Publication Date 2022-07

Publication Place - American Physical Society

Type Periodical

Language English

Digital Yes

Manuscript No

Library Özyeğin University

Library Asset ID 2469-9926

Record ID 3f9835c2-13f7-456c-ba5c-931ffa11bcf0

Library Location Electrical & Electronics Engineering

Date 2022-07

Notes TÜBİTAK

Sample Text Quantum-key-distribution protocols are known to be vulnerable against a side channel attack that exploits the time difference in detectors' responses used to obtain key bits. The recommended solution against this timing side channel attack is to use a large time bin width instead of high-resolution timing information. A common notion is that using a large bin width reduces the resolution of detectors' responses, hence supposedly minimizes the information leakage to an eavesdropper. We challenge this conventional wisdom and demonstrate that increasing the bin width does not monotonically reduce the mutual information between the key bits and the eavesdropper's observation of detectors' responses. Instead of randomly increasing the bin width, it should be carefully chosen because the mutual information fluctuates with respect to the bin width. We also examine the effect of full width half maximums (FWHMs) of the detectors' responses on the mutual information and show that decreasing the FWHM increases the mutual information. Lastly, the start time of binning is also shown to be important in the binning process and the mutual information fluctuates periodically with respect to it.

DOI 10.1103/PhysRevA.106.012611

Cilt 106