Damaged durable goods, upgrades, and the coase conjecture

Name: Damaged durable goods, upgrades, and the coase conjecture
Author: Özener, Başak Altan

İsim	Damaged durable goods, upgrades, and the coase conjecture
Yazar	Özener, Başak Altan
Basım Tarihi:	2018-12
Basım Yeri	- Mohr Siebeck
Konu	Durable goods, Monopoly, Damaged goods, Upgrades, Pricing
Tür	Süreli Yayın
Dil	İngilizce
Dijital	Evet
Yazma	Hayır
Kütüphane:	Özyeğin Üniversitesi
Demirbaş Numarası	0932-4569
Kayıt Numarası	3b31450a-0787-4926-ae7a-19a087ac795d
Lokasyon	Economics
Tarih	2018-12
Örnek Metin	This study analyzes a damaged-goods market for a perfectly durable good in an infinite-horizon, discrete-time game. We characterize Markov perfect equilibria of this game under different buyer upgrade possibilities as a function of the common discount factor, the length of the time period between successive price changes, and the quality levels of the goods. We establish that introducing a lower-quality good (or equivalently, damaging a good) works as a commitment device only if consumers holding a durable good cannot reenter the market. When a buyer can upgrade the product, we establish that for all parameter values the Coase conjecture survives.
DOI	10.1628/093245618X15160188867245
Cilt	174

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Damaged durable goods, upgrades, and the coase conjecture

Yazar Özener, Başak Altan

Basım Tarihi 2018-12

Basım Yeri - Mohr Siebeck

Konu Durable goods, Monopoly, Damaged goods, Upgrades, Pricing

Tür Süreli Yayın

Dil İngilizce

Dijital Evet

Yazma Hayır

Kütüphane Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Demirbaş Numarası 0932-4569

Kayıt Numarası 3b31450a-0787-4926-ae7a-19a087ac795d

Lokasyon Economics

Tarih 2018-12

Örnek Metin This study analyzes a damaged-goods market for a perfectly durable good in an infinite-horizon, discrete-time game. We characterize Markov perfect equilibria of this game under different buyer upgrade possibilities as a function of the common discount factor, the length of the time period between successive price changes, and the quality levels of the goods. We establish that introducing a lower-quality good (or equivalently, damaging a good) works as a commitment device only if consumers holding a durable good cannot reenter the market. When a buyer can upgrade the product, we establish that for all parameter values the Coase conjecture survives.

DOI 10.1628/093245618X15160188867245

Cilt 174