Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects

Name: Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects
Author: Ekici, Ozgun

İsim	Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects
Yazar	Ekici, Ozgun
Basım Tarihi:	2024-05
Basım Yeri	- Econometric Society
Konu	D82, D63, D61, C78, Top trading cycles, Individually rational, Strategy-proof, Pair efficient, Indivisible object
Tür	Süreli Yayın
Dil	İngilizce
Dijital	Evet
Yazma	Hayır
Kütüphane:	Özyeğin Üniversitesi
Demirbaş Numarası	1933-6837
Kayıt Numarası	72b4e08b-abf9-43fa-8f07-a4ecf918324f
Lokasyon	Economics
Tarih	2024-05
Örnek Metin	We revisit the classical object reallocation problem under strict preferences. When attention is constrained to the set of Pareto-efficient rules, it is known that top trading cycles (TTC) is the only rule that is strategy-proof and individually rational. We relax this constraint and consider pair efficiency. A rule is pair-efficient if it never induces an allocation at which a pair of agents gain from trading their assigned objects. Remarkably, even in the larger set of pair-efficient rules, we find that TTC is still the only rule that is strategy-proof and individually rational. Our characterization result gives strong support to the use of TTC in object reallocation problems.
DOI	10.3982/TE5471
Cilt	19

Kaynağa git Özyeğin Üniversitesi

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Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects

Yazar Ekici, Ozgun

Basım Tarihi 2024-05

Basım Yeri - Econometric Society

Konu D82, D63, D61, C78, Top trading cycles, Individually rational, Strategy-proof, Pair efficient, Indivisible object

Tür Süreli Yayın

Dil İngilizce

Dijital Evet

Yazma Hayır

Kütüphane Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Demirbaş Numarası 1933-6837

Kayıt Numarası 72b4e08b-abf9-43fa-8f07-a4ecf918324f

Lokasyon Economics

Tarih 2024-05

Örnek Metin We revisit the classical object reallocation problem under strict preferences. When attention is constrained to the set of Pareto-efficient rules, it is known that top trading cycles (TTC) is the only rule that is strategy-proof and individually rational. We relax this constraint and consider pair efficiency. A rule is pair-efficient if it never induces an allocation at which a pair of agents gain from trading their assigned objects. Remarkably, even in the larger set of pair-efficient rules, we find that TTC is still the only rule that is strategy-proof and individually rational. Our characterization result gives strong support to the use of TTC in object reallocation problems.

DOI 10.3982/TE5471

Cilt 19