The strategic logic of digital disinformation: Offence, defence and deterrence in information warfare

Name: The strategic logic of digital disinformation: Offence, defence and deterrence in information warfare
Author: Ünver, Hamid Akın, Ertan, A. S.

İsim	The strategic logic of digital disinformation: Offence, defence and deterrence in information warfare
Yazar	Ünver, Hamid Akın, Ertan, A. S.
Basım Tarihi:	2023-01-01
Basım Yeri	- Taylor & Francis
Tür	Kitap
Dil	İngilizce
Dijital	Evet
Yazma	Hayır
Kütüphane:	Özyeğin Üniversitesi
Demirbaş Numarası	978-100090817-6
Kayıt Numarası	8160e9b4-2f92-4a0b-9ab9-82cbe16426c6
Lokasyon	International Relations
Tarih	2023-01-01
Örnek Metin	Why do countries engage in disinformation campaigns even though they know that they will likely be debunked later on? We explore a core puzzle in information warfare in which countries that pursue disinformation to confuse and demobilise their adversaries usually suffer from reputational penalties after they are debunked, yet they nonetheless continue to pursue such tactics. In order to explain this dilemma, we employ a formal model and walk through anarchy, pre-emption and cost miscalculation explanations of disinformation and demonstrate that countries may rationally engage in disinformation campaigns if they have a different calculus about reputational costs, if they believe their adversaries will not be able to debunk their claims successfully, and if those adversaries will not be able to disseminate their debunked claims well enough to incur reputational costs on the initiator. Ultimately, we suggest that deterrence in information warfare is attainable if the “defender” can signal its debunking and “naming-shaming” capacity prior to the disinformation campaign and if it can mobilise the support of the international audience against the attacker. We conclude by arguing that a country’s fact-checking ecosystem and its pre-existing perception within the mainstream international digital media environment are the strongest defences against disinformation.
Editör	Arcos, R., Chiru, I., Ivan, C.
DOI	10.4324/9781003190363-17

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The strategic logic of digital disinformation: Offence, defence and deterrence in information warfare

Yazar Ünver, Hamid Akın, Ertan, A. S.

Basım Tarihi 2023-01-01

Basım Yeri - Taylor & Francis

Tür Kitap

Dil İngilizce

Dijital Evet

Yazma Hayır

Kütüphane Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Demirbaş Numarası 978-100090817-6

Kayıt Numarası 8160e9b4-2f92-4a0b-9ab9-82cbe16426c6

Lokasyon International Relations

Tarih 2023-01-01

Örnek Metin Why do countries engage in disinformation campaigns even though they know that they will likely be debunked later on? We explore a core puzzle in information warfare in which countries that pursue disinformation to confuse and demobilise their adversaries usually suffer from reputational penalties after they are debunked, yet they nonetheless continue to pursue such tactics. In order to explain this dilemma, we employ a formal model and walk through anarchy, pre-emption and cost miscalculation explanations of disinformation and demonstrate that countries may rationally engage in disinformation campaigns if they have a different calculus about reputational costs, if they believe their adversaries will not be able to debunk their claims successfully, and if those adversaries will not be able to disseminate their debunked claims well enough to incur reputational costs on the initiator. Ultimately, we suggest that deterrence in information warfare is attainable if the “defender” can signal its debunking and “naming-shaming” capacity prior to the disinformation campaign and if it can mobilise the support of the international audience against the attacker. We conclude by arguing that a country’s fact-checking ecosystem and its pre-existing perception within the mainstream international digital media environment are the strongest defences against disinformation.

Editör Arcos, R., Chiru, I., Ivan, C.

DOI 10.4324/9781003190363-17