Transcendental ethics

Name: Transcendental ethics
Author: Oktar, Sibel

İsim	Transcendental ethics
Yazar	Oktar, Sibel
Basım Tarihi:	2011
Basım Yeri	- Springer
Tür	Kitap
Dil	İngilizce
Dijital	Evet
Yazma	Hayır
Kütüphane:	Özyeğin Üniversitesi
Demirbaş Numarası	978-94-007-0624-8
Kayıt Numarası	7e40699a-abcd-4353-8ee8-32179d35369b
Lokasyon	Humanities and Social Sciences
Tarih	2011
Notlar	Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription.
Örnek Metin	Our ontological, epistemological and metaphysical point of view is a very important determinant of how we conceive ethics and the possibility of ethical discourse. Kant, G.E. Moore and Wittgenstein had a quite eloquent discourse on ethics though they were, prima facie, incompatible. Kant regards ethics as belonging to supersensible reality, Moore, tells us that “goodness” is a non-natural and intuitively known notion. Wittgenstein says he “respected deeply” that that he himself could not talk about. Both Kant and Wittgenstein might at least find a common point on the idea of ethics being transcendental, whereas Moore strongly objects. I will try to show that Moore’s notion of “good” as a non-natural object that does not exist in time is difficult to conceive without assuming a “transcendental object” and the existence of a supersensible reality, as Kant does. I will investigate the role of transcending the limits of language in Wittgenstein’s conception of ethics where it manifests itself in our attitude towards the world. I will argue that Wittgenstein suggests a transcendental ethics with an account of viewing the world sub specie aeterni, without a need for a supersensible reality.
Cilt	108

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Transcendental ethics

Yazar Oktar, Sibel

Basım Tarihi 2011

Basım Yeri - Springer

Tür Kitap

Dil İngilizce

Dijital Evet

Yazma Hayır

Kütüphane Özyeğin Üniversitesi

Demirbaş Numarası 978-94-007-0624-8

Kayıt Numarası 7e40699a-abcd-4353-8ee8-32179d35369b

Lokasyon Humanities and Social Sciences

Tarih 2011

Notlar Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription.

Örnek Metin Our ontological, epistemological and metaphysical point of view is a very important determinant of how we conceive ethics and the possibility of ethical discourse. Kant, G.E. Moore and Wittgenstein had a quite eloquent discourse on ethics though they were, prima facie, incompatible. Kant regards ethics as belonging to supersensible reality, Moore, tells us that “goodness” is a non-natural and intuitively known notion. Wittgenstein says he “respected deeply” that that he himself could not talk about. Both Kant and Wittgenstein might at least find a common point on the idea of ethics being transcendental, whereas Moore strongly objects. I will try to show that Moore’s notion of “good” as a non-natural object that does not exist in time is difficult to conceive without assuming a “transcendental object” and the existence of a supersensible reality, as Kant does. I will investigate the role of transcending the limits of language in Wittgenstein’s conception of ethics where it manifests itself in our attitude towards the world. I will argue that Wittgenstein suggests a transcendental ethics with an account of viewing the world sub specie aeterni, without a need for a supersensible reality.

Cilt 108